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Foreword 
 
This Major Research Paper (MRP) is the culmination of a course of study designed to 
provide a thorough understanding of the mainstream agricultural model with its focus on 
efficiency.  The focus of my plan of study is to understand and analyze the flaws within this 
system so as to understand the emerging alternatives.  I wish to see how to overcome the failures 
of the industrialized food system and fears of food insecurity through a sustainable agriculture 
model. 
The subject of the MRP will require that I lay out the current dominant regulatory 
framework that governs liability within the agriculture sector which is one aspect of 
understanding the present mainstream agriculture model based on efficiency.   
I will be presenting an approach that promotes equitable liability, which in turn can help 
alleviate the economic uncertainty that many farms face with the advanced corporatization of the 
farming industry.  The approach would address some of the weaknesses in the industrialized 
food system and directly comports with my Alternative Approach Component, particularly 
learning objective 2.3, an alternative food security model that is grounded in social justice.  A 
liability regime could be a component of such an alternative model.  Learning objectives 3.2 will 
be explored as I must first understand other approaches to liability that have been pursued in the 
name of sustainable farming, both in Canada and abroad, before identifying the gaps that need to 
be addressed. 
My third component, environmental economics, places a heavy emphasis on preserving 
natural capital, which it is believed cannot be substituted by human-made capital.  Establishing a 
regulatory framework for liability could affect the way in which producers and users approach 
their business so that natural capital ie. diversity in seeds enjoys greater protection. 
iii 
 
Abstract 
An increasing amount of litigation has been seen to address the spread of genetically 
engineered (GE) genes; however the focus has largely been on patent infringement to protect the 
seed developers. Farmers that lose profits due to the contamination of their fields by the 
(unintentional) flow of gene drift however are often overlooked. This paper tries to address this 
gap by asking how the current Canadian legal framework deals with the matter of recourse for 
GE contamination. Finding this system deficient, the paper then looks toward the common law 
procedures to mediate a solution. An overview of how other jurisdictions have dealt with the 
matter gives a basis of what opportunities may be available in the Canadian system. I use a 
socio-ecological framework as well as a more traditional policy analysis to assess the 
effectiveness of the Canadian regulations in coping with the issue of liability due to 
contamination. The paper concludes by recommending managing contamination through a 
compensatory fund on a strict liability basis at the provincial level. The funding ought to come 
from a seed tax paid by those who benefit financially from the introduction of the GE seeds so as 
to ensure that both the polluter‟s pay principle is respected as well as allowing for a type of 
ecological monitoring of the ecosystem.   
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1. Introduction to Topic 
Despite technical and physical protocols in place to separate genetically engineered (GE) 
crops from conventional or organic crops, there is mounting evidence that containment does not 
appear to be the current reality.  The dispersal of GE pollen to unintended areas has the potential 
to create a great deal of environmental disruption.
1
  This paper, however, deals with the 
economic disruption that such contamination could cause, specifically, for the farmers that suffer 
financial loss due to contamination.  Non-GE farmers and in particular organic farmers are in 
danger of losing out on their price-premium revenue due to de-certification or sales loss due to 
trade barriers on the grounds of contamination.  For farmers that have spent a great deal of time 
and resources developing their business to capture the non-GE market, such loss could be 
significant or even the end of their business completely.  On the other hand, implementing a 
robust liability system that addresses contamination can potentially allow for greater market 
predictability and economic sustainability, particularly in overseas markets where GE products 
are still regarded with scepticism. 
This paper first asks how the current Canadian legal framework deals with the matter of 
recourse for GE contamination?  Finding that the system is deficient, the paper then seeks to 
answer the question of what regulatory scheme ought to be put in place in Canada in order to 
allow for a fair and equitable liability framework.  I include an overview of the common law 
approaches to liability to gauge their suitability in the GE context.  By reviewing what other 
countries have done to construct a regulatory framework for liability, I identify dimensions of 
these systems that would be useful to the Canadian context which helps inform my final 
recommendations section. 
                                                          
1
 Bjorkquist, S. & Winfield M., (1999). “The Regulation Of Agricultural Biotechnology In Canada.” Canadian 
Institute of Environmental Law and Policy, p 6. 
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Embedded in many of these questions is how to determine damage for fair and equitable 
compensation as well as practical or policy considerations to determine who bears the ultimate 
burden of compensating for the damage.  Such questions will be answered within my objective to 
establish a framework that is equitable in terms of both environmental sustainability and access 
to justice for traditionally underrepresented populations. 
My research moves from the industry‟s current presumption that GE crops can be 
contained, to the explicit acceptance that transference will occur.  The research assumes that 
there is a willingness on the part of the government to address the implications of cross-
contamination and that the issue at hand is thus how such shifts ought to be facilitated.  The final 
regulatory framework should be one that allows for a type of equitable outcome where the duty-
bearer is held liable due to a set of ethical or moral considerations.  The final objective then is to 
design a framework that allows for farmers that have suffered financial loses to recoup those 
damages through the conviction of a responsible party that has or could potentially benefit in 
some way from the contamination.  
1.1 Methodology 
A few broad analytical frameworks will help guide my research.  Following a Socio-
Ecological Systems Analysis, I will make the connections between ecology, economic, social 
and institutional systems that have fostered unsustainable trends in the use of natural resources.
2
  
Elinor Ostrom‟s Socio-Ecological Systems framework focuses on the interactions of humans and 
institutions within particular common pool ecosystems in order to determine the level of 
cooperation needed amongst the users to develop a long-term sustainable resource strategy. 
                                                          
2
 Otto, I. (2004). “Advanced Empirical Methodology for Socio-Ecological Systems Analysis.” Multiple  
Methods, Game Theory and Behavioural Experiments. Thaer-Institute Resource Economics. 
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Legal theory will also assist me in conceptualizing my paper.  Analytical jurisprudence, 
instead of legal formalism (which posits that there is a type of mechanical analysis that can 
produce „correct laws‟), attempts to use a neutral point of view and a more narrative dialogue 
when discussing aspects of the legal system in question.  The OECD‟s approach to assessing 
policies allows for a systematic method while remaining flexible enough to be adapted to the 
paper‟s needs, in this case in incorporate a more nuanced ethical analysis. 
The textual design of the project involves a broad overview of the current regulatory 
system and competing theories from Europe.  There is a small sample of people who are familiar 
with this area of work who have acted as confirming or disconfirming informants (I have 
circulated to them drafts of my ideas for feedback).  Using this feedback I have redesigned the 
hypothesis to align with their suggested norms of legal theory. 
I have gathered and organized the research using tools taught by Prof. Liora Salter in 
Applied Research Methods (ENVS 6312).  I relied less on newspaper clippings and instead 
gathered information from journal articles and farm magazines, highlighting and indexing key 
concepts, laws and actors.  The material was organized in categories of 1) research theories and 
2) one field for each type of statutory law that appeared applicable.  In order to answer my 
research question I sought information on how specific legislative drafting can impact the 
economic and social outcomes of a claim.  I gathered this by looking at environmental statutes 
that incorporate liability (even if only for public rights).  I gathered information on how 
regulations under the federal jurisdiction differ from those implemented under provincial 
jurisdiction in order to recommend using one or both jurisdictions.  
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2. History of GE Plants   
 The art of plant manipulation for agricultural purposes has an extensive history, most 
often triggered by pests or droughts; human intervention has also had a featuring role.  Farmers 
have often sought to better their yields, initially through natural selection and after the 1865 
discovery of the basis of heredity, hybrids, through breeding, were being created with more 
predictable characteristic outcomes.
3
  In the 1930s, corn became the first hybrid crop to be 
widely marketed and an economic success in North America.
4
  The more recent introduction of 
genetic engineering however has been a drastic trajectory shift.  While earlier manipulation 
would be done by combining varieties of the same species, mechanical genetic engineering 
(using rDNA technology) is done instead by inserting genes from one specie, to a 
different/foreign specie.
5
  To date the most prevalent GE manipulation involves creating plants 
that are able to survive weed-killing pesticides or plants that generate toxins to ward off specific 
insects (pests).
6
 
Research on rDNA technology to genetically engineer plants accelerated through the 
1980s and by 1996 the first commercial biotech crops were planted.
7
  By 2013, plantings had 
risen to over 175 million hectares, a significant increase from the 1.7 million planted in 1996.
8
  
This equates to roughly 12% of the annual global crop.
9
 The majority of those crops are planted 
in 5 countries: the United States, Brazil, Argentina, India and Canada.
10
 
                                                          
3
 Repp, R. “Biotech Pollution: Assessing Liability for Genetically Modifies Crop Production and Genetic Drift.” 36 
Idaho L. Rev. 585, 2000. P 588. 
4
 Reinhardt, C and Bill Ganzel, (2003). “The Science of Hybrids.” The Ganzel Group. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Strauss, Debra. (Fall 2012). “Liability for Genetically Modified Foods: Are GMOs a Tort Waiting to Happen?.”  
TheSciTechLawyer. p 9. 
7
 James, Clive. (2013). “Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2013.” ISAAA Brief-46 s. Top Ten 
Facts.  
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Listed in descending order with USA plating over 70 million hectors. Ibid. 
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Canada‟s total GE crop area decreased slightly in 2013 to 10.8 million hectors.11  While 
12 different crops have been approved for unconfined release in Canada only four are currently 
being cultivated significantly within the country; namely, corn, canola, soy and sugar beet.  A 
few additional GE products are imported into Canada including cotton seed oil, papaya, squash 
and milk products produced using a GE veterinary drug.  Despite the seemingly small number of 
GE plants in Canada, because of their pervasive inclusion in food production, as much as 80% of 
all processed food sold on Canadian shelves now may contain some form of GE material.
12
  As 
of 2012, over eighty-one genetically modified foods had been approved by the CFIA.
13
  This has 
led some to claim GE is the fastest growing crop technology in recent history.
14
 
Proponents of GE use in agriculture point to outcomes such as reduction of insecticide 
use, increased yield, drought resistant plants and potential increased nutritional value.
15
  On the 
other hand, many scientists question these conclusions and point to the possible allergenic effects 
that such manipulation can create
16
 and the potential long term negative ecological and health 
consequences.  Some studies have indicated that animals fed with GE plants may have increased 
rates of liver and kidney problems.
17
  Organic farmers have complained that the plants inserted 
with the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt)
18
 toxin gene aimed at repelling certain pests has resulted in 
                                                          
11
 This was a decrease from 11.6 million the previous year due to an increase in wheat crop rotation and decrease in 
GE Canola. Ibid. 
12
 Non-GMO Project. (2014). “GMO Facts.”  
13
 (2012). “Frequently Asked Questions - Biotechnology and Genetically Modified Foods”, Health Canada,  
14
 Supra note 7. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Bernstein JA, Bernstein IL, Bucchini L, et al. Clinical and laboratory investigation of allergy to genetically 
modified foods. Env Health Perspect. 2003;111:1114-21. 
17
 Séralini GE, Cellier D, Spiroux de Vendomois J. New analysis of a rat feeding study with a genetically modified 
maize reveals signs of hepatorenal toxicity. Arch Environ Contam Toxicol. 2007;52:596–602. 
18
  Bt is a naturally occurring soil bacterium.  Part of the bacterium, when isolated can produce a protein called Bt 
delta endotoxin which is able to kill of European corn borer, a pest affecting many corn farmers.  Farmers are able to 
plant these Bt corn to avoid having to use insecticides to manage the pest. Bessin, R. (2004). “Bt-CORN: WHAT IT 
IS AND HOW IT WORKS.” University of Kentucky College of Agriculture. 
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Bt resistant pests.
19
  Since Bt is one of the few insecticides permitted for organic farmers, this 
may result in additional hardships or reduced yields for them.   
However, cross contamination, through gene drift, is an even bigger issue for organic 
farmers.  The term describes the process of cross-pollination between biotech and non-biotech 
fields that results in tainting the organic crop.  Besides the potential that gene drift could result in 
a net reduction in biodiversity, the economic consequences for farmers could be dramatic; loss of 
certification (organic standards do not permit GE technology), loss of an entire year‟s profits or 
even one‟s complete livelihood. 
Early indications of GE technology‟s economic benefits encouraged the government to 
facilitate research and fund a task force on biotechnology.
20
  Establishing whether the industry 
was commercially viable was the initial concern and attention to risk assessments and regulation 
were implemented after trial testing and small releases had begun.
21
  The risk assessments and 
their underlying assumptions (discussed below) were thus geared towards this initial smaller 
scale operation.  While the scale of commercialisation has rapidly increased, the regulatory 
framework has not been adapted to this change and rests on the assumption that the results found 
in performing the small scale operations can simply be replicated in the larger, industrialized 
context with the same predictability and effects.
22
  This has meant present regulations do not take 
into consideration certain concerns associated with scale that are becoming increasingly pressing 
as production expands.   
                                                          
19
 Gassmann AJ, Petzold-Maxwell JL, Keweshan RS, Dunbar MW. Field-evolved resistance to Bt maize by Western 
corn rootworm. PLoS ONE. 2011;6:e22629. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022629. 
20
 Berrett, K and Elisabeth Abergel. (February 2000). “Breeding Familiarity: Environmental Risk Assessment for 
genetically engineered Crops in Canada.” Science and Public Policy, vol 27, no 1, p 6. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
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One such concern is the issue of co-mingling.  Initial assumptions were that such co-
existence could be managed and, whatever gene drift occurred would be minimal.  This may 
indeed have been true under the smaller limited release proposals.  Ever increasing 
documentation on the inadequacy of this assumption, even on the part of agricultural officials,
23
 
indicates that some type of reform is necessary to deal with the foreseeable consequences of 
contamination. 
The procedures in place to prevent contamination appear problematic given the 
overreliance on industry efforts.  For instance, the official procedure for commercial segregation 
and quality management for flaxseed transportation is to rely on the companies to employ 
internal quality management systems to guard against cross contamination.
24
  No further 
oversight by an independent body is contemplated.  Contamination testing protocols may also be 
inadequate.  Current testing requires a 2 kg sample of any flax shipment going into the system 
and presumes a 95% probability of detecting GM seeds.  Low levels of contamination within a 
lot however are indistinguishable from a clean seed lot test result given the rate of false 
positives.
25
  Gaps such as these, along with the inevitability of cross-pollination in the natural 
environment indicate that effective co-existence is and will not be a reality.  The reproductive 
characteristics of the plants affect the rate and probability of contamination to neighbouring 
farms.  Corn and Canola pollen is carried by the wind while alfalfa pollen is carried by insects.  
Other crops are not as susceptible to wind at all like wheat and barley, which are self-pollinating 
instead of outcrossing.
26
  In wind reliant pollinating plants like corn, environmental conditions – 
                                                          
23
 Kling, J. (1996). “Could transgenic supercrops one day breed superweeds?” Science 274:180-181. 
24
 Canadian Grain Commission. (2014). “Sampling and testing protocol for Canadian flaxseed exported to the 
European Union.” 
25
 Booker, H., & Lamb, E. (2012). Quantification of low-level GM seed presence in Canadian commercial flax 
stocks. AgBioForum, 15(1), 31-35. 
26
 http://cls.casa.colostate.edu/transgeniccrops/croptocrop.html 
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temperature, wind speed, and wind direction – can all impact the likelihood of cross-pollination.  
Despite corn pollen grains being rather large and heavy, transportation through air is possible for 
several kilometres.
27
  The likelihood of pollination however has been measured at significantly 
shorter distances, with cross-pollination dropping by 99% by 12-15 matters.
28
 
3. Overview of the Canadian GE Regulatory Framework 
 GE products can be regulated in a number of ways depending on at what stage they are in 
the commercialisation process.  Much of the current GE risk assessment regulatory framework 
falls within the purview of federal Ministries.  The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), 
which is overseen by the federal Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, is mandated by several 
acts to ensure that GE plants or seeds are safe to be imported and grown in the open 
environment.
29
  Health Canada, under its authority in the Food and Drug Act, is authorized to 
perform assessments to ensure that GE plants used in foods are safe for consumption; that they 
can be sold to Canadians.
30
  Finally, Environment Canada can regulate products that have not 
been addressed by other federal laws, through their powers under the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act (CEPA).
31
  CEPA aims to prevent pollution by monitoring air and water quality. 
Environment Canada, through several Acts is also able to regulate animals and plants in order to 
ensure ecological biodiversity. 
CFIA‟s objective is to allow safe GE plants to be released into the environment, on a 
commercial level.  In doing so, the agency assesses the safety of the GE product, not the process 
                                                          
27
 Jemison, J.M., & Vayda, M.E. (2001). Cross pollination from genetically engineered corn: Wind transport and 
seed source. AgBioForum, 4(2). 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Moran, T., et al. (2009). “A Cause of Action for Regulatory Negligence? The Regulatory Framework for 
Genetically Modified Crops in Canada and the Potential for Regulator Liability.” 6:1&2 UOLTJ 1; p 5. 
30
 Ibid p 6.  
31
 Ibid. 
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by which it was genetically modified.
32
  For example, the Seeds Act, administered by the CFIA, 
does not distinguish between plants with natural genetic mutation, which occurs over long 
periods of time through traditional farming practices, and genetic modifications in a laboratory 
through rDNA technology.
33
  This approach differentiates Canada‟s regulatory framework from 
that used in Europe.  By focusing the risk analysis on the final product, the Canadian system is 
assuming that because the final creation, say an alfalfa sprout, is essentially the same in 
composition as an alfalfa sprout grown from a conventional seed, that the different design, 
manipulation and use of genetically modified seeds is irrelevant to the safety analysis.
34
  All that 
needs to be assessed then is the relative safety of the final product in relation to comparable 
marketable products.  In Europe, however, during the 1990s, the European Council adopted 
Directive 90/220/EEC on the Deliberate Release of Genetically Modified Organisms.
35
  The 
framework established from this directive was grounded in the precautionary principle which 
requires that risk assessment procedures for the development of GMOs (the process by which the 
organism will be modified), be approved before any test trials can take place. 
What is at issue in Canada then, is the novelty of the final product.  The notion of novelty 
has been embedded in all the core GE regulations.   The CFIA defines a novel plant as “a new 
variety of a species that has one or more traits that are novel to that species in Canada”.36  A 
novel trait is then defined as an element that “is new to stable, cultivated populations of the plant 
species in Canada, and it has the potential to have an environmental effect”.37  Both elements, the 
                                                          
32
 Berrett, K and Elisabeth Abergel. (January 2002). “Defining a Safe Genetically Modified Organism: Boundaries 
of scientific risk assessment” Science and Public Policy, vol 29, no 1, p 50. 
33
 Seeds Act, RSC 1985 c. S-8. 
34
 Lynch, D and David Vogel. (2001). "The Regulation of GMOs in Europe and the United States: A Case-Study of 
Contemporary European Regulatory Politics." Council on Foreign Relations. 
35
 Council Directive 90/220/EEC on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified 
organisms. 
36
CFIA, Canadian food Inspection Agency. (2014). "Novelty" and Plants with Novel Traits.  
37
 Idid. 
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introduction or the specie and the potential threat, must be present before the plant is considered 
novel. Health Canada defines novel foods as: products that do not have a history of safe use as a 
food; foods resulting from a process not previously used for food; or foods that have been 
modified by genetic manipulation.
38
  Genetic manipulation here again refers to both genetic 
engineering and genetic alternations that occur naturally or through traditional farming 
techniques.  Once a plant or food is determined to be novel, a thorough risk assessment is 
required.   
The concept of novelty is operationalized through an analysis determining whether the 
final product in question is deemed to be „substantially equivalent‟ (SE) to other products that 
are safe within the Canadian market.  Substantial equivalency is a statutory concept more so then 
a scientific model to determine safety.  SE is defined by CFIA as “the equivalence of a novel 
trait within a particular plant species, in terms of its specific use and safety to the environment 
and human health, to those in that same species, that are in use and generally considered as safe 
in Canada, based on valid scientific rationale.”39  When measuring the „use and safety to the 
environment‟ what is actually being asked for is whether the proposed GE specie will 1. increase 
the potential for weediness, 2. become a “plant pest,” 3. negatively affect non-target organisms 
or biodiversity, 4. transfer to related species and  5. have a negative effect on biodiversity.
40
  This 
is then a statutory concept given that the parameters of what is meant by environmentally safe 
are clearly defined in narrow terms to accommodate the dominant policy objectives.  The issue 
of crop contamination due to gene flow could potentially come into play under sections 3, 4 or 5.  
However, as these questions are posed to the applicants themselves based on their initial field 
                                                          
38
 Health Canada (2013).  “Genetically Modified (GM) Foods and other Novel Foods.” 
39
 AAFC, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (1994), Assessment Criteria for Determining Environmental Safety of 
Plants With Novel.Traits, Regulatory Directive 94-08 (AAFC, Ottawa). 
40
 Supra note 33. 
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tests (aimed at producing a commercially viable product), the answers rely more on a decision-
making process rather than a scientific analysis of their actual effect on the environment.
41
  Once 
these questions are answered in the affirmative, the proposed GE plant‟s safety is assumed as 
they are substantially similar to other plants that are „generally considered as safe‟, and their 
unconfined release into the environment is permitted.  It is only when the legal test of Substantial 
Equivalence has not been met that a product will be deemed to be „new‟ and in need of an 
individualised risk assessment. However, in Canada no submitted product has yet failed this test 
and subsequently been submitted for further assessments. 
Once a product has been flagged as one that requires a full science-based risk assessment, 
the Plant Biosafety Office must be contacted to initiate the evaluation.  The process itself is 
virtually identical to that of determining SE
42
 since the same 5 questions posed above are used to 
assess the level of risk.  The difference now is instead of determining how these factors compare 
to other commercial plants, the question turns to whether the noted differences pose an 
unacceptable level of risk to the environment.  How this level is determined is difficult to gauge 
since much of the data submitted for the review is owned by the corporations who may opt to file 
the application as confidential and thus deny access to the public for peer review.
 43
  Some risk 
within the Canadian regulatory system is permitted but if and how much risk in the form of crop 
contamination is deemed acceptable by the regulators has not been made clear.  The type of data 
submitted may include; public variety trials; in-house research previously conducted by the 
developers; published literature; and developer led private experiments.
44
  The assessment is then 
                                                          
41
 Supra note 29 p 7-8.  Explaining that the ambiguity of the concept of SE has led to various threshold definitions 
but that CFIA has opted to use the weaker “decision-threshold” grounded in assumptions opposed to a scientific-
threshold. 
42
 Supra note 39. 
43
 Sierra Club of Canada National Office. Regulation of Genetically Engineered Foods: A „Novel‟ Idea.  
44
 Supra note 32 p 50. 
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based entirely on what the developers themselves submit as there is no requirement for the 
government to conduct an independent study or seek third party input.
45
  The few times that the 
government has sought independent advice, their actions were usually preceded by a great deal 
of external pressure, e.g., recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone. 
3.0.1 Division of Power 
The Federal government is able to regulate GE under a number of the constitutional 
authorities.  Health Canada‟s legislative powers under the Food and Drug Act are ratified under 
subsection 91(27) of the Constitution Act which gives Parliament exclusive authority to enact 
laws that concern „criminal law.‟  The offences need not be listed in the Criminal Code; it allows 
Parliament to create criminal legislation if it is relevant to a public health mischief.
46
  For 
example, the Food and Drug Act makes it a criminal offence for any manufacturer to knowingly 
sell GM food that has not completed the pre-market notification and safety assessment process.  
CFIA on the other hand administers the majority of their GE regulatory power through the Seeds 
Act (environmental release and variety registration) and the Plant Protection Act (importation).  
These acts have been authorised under section 95 and 91(2) of the Constitution Act respectively.  
Section 95 allows for the management of agriculture, jointly with provincial governments and s. 
91(2) gives Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over „trade and commerce‟ matters. 47 
The current lack of provincial oversight is presumably due to the desire to not interfere or 
duplicate the federal government‟s efforts.  In an email responding to a request for a provincial 
review, Kate Jordon, a spokesperson for the Ontario Ministry of Environment, stated that there 
are no plans to incorporate GE review into the provincial “Environmental Assessment Act as 
                                                          
45
 Supra note 43. 
46
 Jackman, M. (2002). “Constitutional Jurisdiction Over Health in Canada,” Health Law Journal 8:99-102. 
47
 Gabler, Melissa. (2008). “Intergovernmental Relations in Food Biotechnology Governance: Complementary 
Disentanglement in Regulation with Collaboration in Food Safety and Inspection.” Institute of Intergovernmental 
Relations School of Policy Studies: Queen‟s University, issue 5. p 13. 
13 
 
these activities are already regulated by the federal government.”48  The provincial government 
could regulate GE under a number of constitutional heads of power.  Provinces can enact food 
inspection legislation under their s. 92(13) “property and civil rights,” powers which have been 
understood as intra-provincial trade and commerce powers.
49
  Provinces also have sections 
92(16) (matters relating to a local or private nature) and 95 (agriculture) at their disposal to 
legislate food safety. 
If a provincial government did decide to pursue this avenue, their jurisdiction could be 
limited by the rules that govern Canadian federalism.  The doctrine of Paramountcy stipulates 
that if a provincial and federal law conflict, the federal law must prevail.  This is particularly 
pertinent to potential laws enacted under the jointly held authority of agriculture (s. 95).  
However, this case presents itself only when the provincial law “frustrates” the purpose of the 
federal law.
50
  Duplication alone is not enough to trigger this doctrine.
51
  Inter-jurisdictional 
immunity can also act as a bar to provincial regulations if it is found that the statute significantly 
encroaches on a core function that belongs to the federal government.
52
  However, instituting a 
stricter or more comprehensive assessment would not prevent the federal government from 
pursuing its own goals.  In fact, the Prince Edward Island, Standing Committee on Agriculture, 
Forestry and Environment went so far as to state that current regulations do not prohibit the 
banning of GM organisms by provincial legislation.
53
  Provincial governance could however be 
restricted to oversight within their particular province, as inter-provincial matters (s. 91(2)) are 
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dealt with by the national government, potentially limiting the effectiveness of GE containment 
regulations.   
 3.1 Critiques of the Current Regulatory Assessment Process 
A push for more oversight has been voiced by the Ontario Environment Commissioner 
who urged the Ontario government “to play a more active role in regulating the sale and use of 
GE crops in the province, rather than simply following federal decisions that may not encompass 
provincial environmental goals and interests.”54  One contribution that such regulation could 
provide is the inclusion of economic and social cost considerations in the risk assessment 
process.  Currently the federal “regulatory system is designed simply to approve products for 
commercial introduction if they are judged to be “safe” - there are no explicit questions asked 
about ethics, social and economic impacts, or social need.”55  Expanding the definition of risk 
assessment to include social and economic impacts would likely incorporate the concerns that 
organic and integrated pest-management farmers have about gene flow contamination.   
As has been demonstrated by Elisabeth Abergel, a fundamental concern of the federal 
risk assessment process is the limits that the statutory concept of SE puts on the scientific 
analysis.
56
  Since the legislative requirement for a risk assessment is only triggered if a product is 
found to be novel, many GE plants are simply entered into the environment on the assumption 
that there will be no negative repercussions, despite their difference in composition.  Indeed 
CFIA registers many varieties of GE plants as substantially equivalent on the bases that they are 
derivatives of other SE applications, thus bypassing analysis completely.
57
 Abergal et al. tested 
the strength of this assumption by looking at the 1994 environmental assessments for GE 
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herbicide-tolerant canola which was determined to be “substantially equivalent to canola 
currently approved as livestock feed”.58  The fact that there were added bacterial genes for 
herbicide resistance was not in itself enough to affect its status as „substantially equivalent‟.  This 
is despite evidence that the “rDNA methods used to introduce [the] new traits may affect some 
ecological interactions among the crop and other organisms.”59  
Evaluating the equivalence of a GE plant may not be entirely unreasonable so long as it 
did not impede proper scientific analysis.  In fact, when the concept of SE was first introduced 
by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations and the World Health 
Organisation in the early 1990s, the consultants stressed the point that SE should not be accepted 
as a substitute for risk assessment.
60
 Instead, SE was meant to simply “provide reassurance that 
the new food or food component is comparable in terms of its safety to its conventional 
counterpart”.61  Familiarity is the preliminary step before conducting a SE assessment and refers 
to the knowledge of crops, their traits, the environment and how they interact, which is used as a 
comparator to understand how GE crops may function in relation to a non-GE control.  
„Familiarity‟ with crop characterisation as used in regulatory protocols is also “not a safety 
conclusion, but rather it encompasses the information available at a given point in time and 
serves as a basis from which the risk assessment should proceed.”62  In the Canadian context 
however, it appears that the test for SE and familiarity have eclipsed the actual review process.  
The AAFC have gone so far as to claim that the “principle of familiarity may provide an accurate 
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idea of the relevant risks in the novel product in the absence of direct experience with it.”63  
Despite the contention surrounding the scientific process of familiarity, knowledge within this 
context is used to justify the scaling-up of GE development projects.
64
 
 If SE is to be the measuring stick used to determine the threshold of acceptability, one 
would imagine that a clear and thorough analysis would occur at this point.  However, “the 
concept of substantial equivalence has never been properly defined; the degree of difference 
between a natural food and its GM alternative before its "substance" ceases to be acceptably 
'equivalent' is not defined anywhere, nor has an exact definition been agreed by legislators.”65 
Such ambiguity undermines the regulatory model‟s effectiveness and erodes consumer trust in 
the system. 
Another institutional flaw is the developers‟ ability to self-test their products.  The 
government relies on the companies to notify them if they suspect an adverse effect.  The 
information submitted is gathered by the developers themselves who have a clear financial 
interest in having the proposal succeed.  This relegates the government‟s role to one of reviewer, 
- ensuring all documents have been properly submitted and required protocols followed - rather 
than an actual investigator.
66
  Factoring in the lack of transparency, due to the company‟s work 
being kept confidential and thus hidden from the public, the process looks more like a filing 
system rather than an actual assessment.   
The assessment protocols themselves appear to have some weaknesses as well.  For 
instance, the developers need not explicitly test the product on animals and if they choose to do 
so, a toxicology assessment is not required.  A chemical analysis of the seed is often deemed 
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enough to assess its equivalence and feeding tests are only mandated in cases where some 
suspicion has been raised.
67
  Potential health concerns are thus overlooked as a chemical 
analysis, even if similar to traditional compositions, cannot predict fully how they will interact 
once consumed by individuals.  Another example of a weakness is that the data requirements do 
not necessitate the developers to monitor trait stability over a sufficient number of sites or over a 
long period of time.
68
  This means that environmental interactions that do not appear 
immediately or are inconsistent based on geographic locations are not documented or 
considered.
69
  This is also a concern for contamination since the establishment of a trait and the 
possibility of a gene transfer in the open environment depends on “agricultural practices, 
viability of pollen, and availability of out-crossing partners.”70  These are not necessarily present 
during the testing and assessment phases. 
 Furthermore the current model does not align with the standards enumerated within Part 
5 and 6 of CEPA.   Given that CEPA mandates that all products of biotechnology be assessed for 
environmental, human health and biodiversity impacts before they may be manufactured, 
imported or put on sale,
71
 it may appear as an alternative model to assess GE plants for their 
potential harmful effects.  Under this approach it is likely that measurements for long-term, 
unanticipated or accidental side-effects (like gene flow) would be taken into consideration.  
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Unfortunately, CEPA does not hold much clout in the current framework as legislators often 
demarcate most acts and regulations related to GE policy as taking precedence over the CEPA.
72
   
These demarcations are clear legislative decisions, to downplay CEPA‟s role and would require a 
change in legislative intent to regulate GE from a more ecological perspective.  
 3.2 Regulating GE through Patent law  
In order for GE plants to become commercially viable, most companies protect their GE 
creations with patents, thus creating another potential area to regulate GE contamination.  
According to the Organic Consumers Association, as of August 2013 Monsanto alone has 
registered over 1600 patents worldwide for plants, plant parts and seeds.
73
  In order to be issued a 
patent under the Patents Act in Canada, the applicant must demonstrate three things. First the 
invention must present something new; 2) the invention involves some sort of inventive step; and 
3) the invention is useful.
74
  Here „useful‟ is interpreted to mean that the proposed „invention‟ 
operates or functions as predicted by the inventor,
75
 eg. does the GE herbicide-resistance seed 
create a herbicide-resistant plant?  This is clearly not a difficult threshold to meet for any GE 
developer.  The patenting of higher life forms such as seeds and plants were rejected in a 
controversial case called Harvard Collage v Canada
76
 where the plaintiff was seeking a patent 
for a mouse that had its genome genetically altered for research purposes.  Unlike in the USA, 
where the plaintiffs won the right to patent both the genome as well as the mouse, the Canadian 
Supreme Court made a distinction between lower life (the altered genes) and the higher life 
forms (what the altered gene was programed to grow into), stating that the line is “defensible on 
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the basis of common sense differences between the two.”77  Justice Bastarache also highlighted 
some serious concerns that would need to be addressed by legislation before such a ruling on 
patents could be made, listing among them the agricultural impact on farmers who wish to save 
and reuse seeds.  Seed patents in Canada should then be meant for the altered genes within the 
seed but not for the eventual plant containing the altered gene.  However in the Schmeiser
78
 case, 
the court held that using the second generation seeds of the original patent constituted patent 
infringement.  Therefore, the patent applicants in this case were able to effectively secure their 
right to patent protection of higher life forms by claiming the entire organism as their product.  
This paradox has yet to be explicitly recognized in patent law. 
 In gene flow or contamination, unwanted GE material is transferred to non-GE crops, 
which is relevant to the patent scheme as it creates a potential situation of patent infringement.  
This can occur since this type of patent carries over to the next generation of seeds and “any 
plants resulting from a hybrid of genetically engineered plants and non-GMO plants”79  Indeed, 
in early 2014, the US Supreme Court ruled that biotechnology companies with patented seeds are 
permitted to sue farmers that are inadvertently contaminated by the GE material.
80
  Several 
organic and farming organisations had sought to have a pre-emptive ruling precluding such 
lawsuits but were denied this on the grounds that Monsanto promised not to pursue legal action 
on those farms that were found to contain traces of the company‟s biotechnology.  A trace in this 
context refers to farms that are affected by less than 1% by the GE material. 
To prevent such misuse of patent rights, legislators have two main alternatives at their 
disposal.  First they could rewrite the patent laws pertaining to GE material to allow for explicit 
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protection of the breeder rights by providing protection to the plant itself but not to the offspring 
or hybrids, leaving “plant buyers free to keep, to reproduce, and to sell seeds.”81  This would 
essentially balance the rights given in the Patents Act with the farmer‟s privilege originally 
promised in the Plant Breeders Act, 1990.   
However, Canada being a member to the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants
82
 (UPOV) regime, has recently codified the rules borne out of the UPOV 
convention by amending the Plant Breeders Act.
83
  The UPOV aims to protect and encourage the 
creation of new varieties of plants by codifying intellectual property rights for plant breeders.  
The pant must be novel, distinct from other varieties, uniform and must be stable but the 
convention does not distinguish between plants that have been created through conventional 
breeding techniques or genetic engineering.   
The amendments to the Plant Breeders Act affords breeders an expanded set of rights.  
There is the cascading right which allows plant breeders to collect royalties beyond the seed 
itself.  Royalties can be collected on the harvested crops and even processed products.  Meaning 
when the farmer goes to sell their crop they will be required to give over a portion of their profit 
to the original seed breeder, making seed saving uneconomic.
84
  Furthermore, the current 
practice of protecting the breeder‟s exclusive right to sell seeds will be expanded to include the 
right to control cleaning and storing.  A farmer‟s right to reseed will be moot if their access to 
storage and cleaning is removed.
85
  All of this amounts to eliminating the farmer‟s privilege to 
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replant seeds initially envisioned in the Plant Breeders Act and along with the IP rights under 
appetent law allows a type of double protection for breeders ie. Biotechnology  corporations. 
Alternatively, legislators could include another element to an infringement lawsuit, that 
of intent.  As it stands now, plaintiffs in infringement suits do not need to demonstrate that the 
defended intended to infringe; the infringement itself is enough proof of wrongdoing.  But as 
Hilary Preston points out, none of these earlier patent infringement cases dealt with self-
propagating organisms.
86
  Legal reform in this manner would allow farmers, who are found to 
inadvertently be in possession of GE plants on their property, to have a sound defence.  Similar 
wording can be found in the UK Patent Act 1977 section 62(1).
87
 
However, these suggestions are still focused on the narrow issue of protecting innocent 
farmers from being sued rather than addressing the larger problem of the lost revenue stream for 
those seeking to benefit financially by avoiding GE plants.  In the current context of patent law, 
what is being protected are the rights of developers to make a commercial profit, rather than any 
protection on grounds of safety or lost biodiversity. 
3.3 Regulating GE Products through Labelling  
Another potential point of regulation for GE products is at the end use point by labeling 
products that contain GE plants.  Food labeling is governed by two departments: Health Canada 
and CFIA.  Both are mandated under the Food and Drugs Act but their responsibilities differ in 
that Health Canada is responsible for managing labels in order to safeguard consumers from 
health and safety concerns, while CFIA‟s role is broader and aims to create common food 
labelling policies and regulations that protect buyers from misrepresentation and fraud.
88
  CFIA 
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aims to ensure products are not misrepresented by managing food labels as well as packaging 
and advertising requirements.
89
 
GE products are largely considered a consumer preference or choice and at the present 
time, labeling is only mandatory when health or safety concerns are at issue.  The threshold to 
trigger labeling for safety and health concerns are not triggered for GE products because they 
have already passed the SE and familiarity tests.  This leaves GE labelling as a voluntary 
measure.  In 2004 the Standards Council of Canada adopted the Voluntary Labelling and 
Advertising of Foods that Are and Are Not Products of Genetic Engineering.  This policy allows 
a food to be labelled as a GE product when more than 95% of its source is genetically 
engineered.
90
  If a food source is between 5 and 95% genetically engineered it may be labelled as 
“a mixture of products of and not of genetic engineering”.91  A food with less than 5% 
genetically engineering cannot be labelled in a way that indicates that it contains any GE.
92
  The 
words „free‟, „100%‟ and „all‟ are not permitted in labeling in relation to GE.93  This may be 
relevant for those wishing to label their products as GE-free.  Labelling foods as not containing 
GE is also not permitted for those items which there have no corresponding GE product,
94
 as the 
possible economic advantage of labeling something as not containing GE, when there is in fact 
no threat of GE in any such items, could be interpreted as fraud.   
While developers have the option to label their foods as GE, for consumers that are 
concerned, there is still a significant gap in the legislation.  Leaving labelling as voluntary has 
meant that most food products in Canada have not been labeled as containing GE, effectively 
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shifting the onus of responsibility of labeling onto those producing foods that do not contain GE.  
There are those, such as the Saskatchewan Organic Directorate that argue that costs associated 
with the segregating and labelling of genetically engineered food should be paid by those who 
are responsible for bringing in this new element, and who consequently benefit financially the 
most from its introduction, “rather than being off-loaded onto others, such as organic producers 
who must bear the expense of being able to certify that their food is non-genetically modified.”95  
The labelling system as it stands in Canada allows for contamination without it being 
labeled as such on the final packaging.  There is an obvious imbedded financial advantage for the 
biotechnology industry but moreover, there are also long term liability implications.  Not only is 
the financial burden shifted to those wanting to farm without GE to create their own certifying 
system, but also shifts the burden of proving damages in a contamination case.  At what 
point/percentage can damages be calculated if a proper labeling system is not recognized?  If 
damages only accrue when an organic certification is lost, a large number of farmers that choose 
to avoid GE would be neglected.  Calculating their damage would be more difficult given that on 
the face of it, the current labeling regulations do not allow for a financial advantage to GE-free 
farming, despite the fact that many seek out their own avenues of achieving a GE-free premium 
price.  The current label system does not allow for a good “triggering” system to measure when 
liability for damages due to contamination is owed since the thresholds do not correlate with the 
realities of marketing.  
3.4 Further Liability Regulations Needed 
It is clear that the regulatory framework is geared towards fostering a commercially 
viable industry and not primarily concerned about curbing the financial risk that some farmers – 
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that do not account for the bulk of the export market – might be exposed to.  While important 
factors such as the environment and health effects are considered to a certain degree under some 
of the above acts, it appears that many crucial factors were left out of the regulatory framework, 
either as an oversight or intentionally in order to diversify the agricultural market.   
What is clear, however, is that as more evidence accumulates indicating an actual market 
loss for many farmers and overall market depression, due to the ban on some exports to 
European and Japanese markets, there is a need for some form of restructuring to incorporate 
concerns about contamination.  There are the more visible examples of profit loss such as when 
GE Starlink corn, which had not been approved for human consumption, was found in taco 
shells.
96
  Despite implementing a „buy-back‟ program, farmers still suffered costs, debt-
repayment delays and face possible civil action.
97
  Increased scrutiny of GE products has led 
some countries to ban various agriculture imports from Canada for fear of contamination, 
resulting in considerable investment losses for farmers engaged in that market.  The question 
then becomes how ought Canada incorporate these financial risks into the GE regulatory system.  
If the existing assessment framework doesn‟t include explicit consideration of economic harm, it 
effectively shifts the responsibility to those threatened and as such it may be appropriate to look 
at what the possible avenues for redress are through a more direct or individual basis. 
4. Traditional Tort Liability 
 In the absence of proper, or specific legislation governing the liabilities of GE 
contamination within the pre-market regulatory framework (an examination of possible post-
market liability schemes currently available is discussed below), farmers who have suffered 
economic lose due to gene flow may attempt to recoup those losses through traditional lawsuits 
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using tort law.  The three areas most applicable to such claims would be Negligence, Nuisance 
(private and strict liability) and trespass.  The section that follows will outline how these areas of 
law function and how they may apply to the case of GE contamination.  The section will 
conclude with an explanation of the unlikelihood of success using this route due to the nature of 
the judiciary forum.  This inference strengthens the argument that a proper legislative model 
needs to be in place to facilitate the protection of vulnerable farmers. 
 4.1 Negligence 
When the court is presented with a case that does not have clear guidance from the 
legislature by way of a statute, the judiciary system has at its disposal common law rules.  These 
rules have been developed and refined over several decades by the judges themselves and build 
upon themselves through analogous precedents.  The majority of common law tort suits fall 
within the category of negligence; and along with nuisance also make up the majority of 
agriculture property damage applications.
98
  For a successful case of negligence, the plaintiff 
must clearly point to a wrongdoer who owed the victim a duty to exercise care.  That is, there 
must have been some form of relationship in which the defendant‟s actions put the plaintiff in a 
position of foreseeable risk.
99
 Secondly, the defendant then fell below the standard of care that 
the duty entailed, or in other words, they did not do what a reasonable person would have done in 
the circumstances. Finally there must be a causative link between the defendant‟s actions (those 
that fell below the standard of care) and the (tangible) damages claimed.  This causation resulting 
in damages must also have been reasonably foreseeable to occur to the plaintiff.
100
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In the context of GE contamination, there are a number of issues that would need to be 
resolved by the courts before a negligence case can succeed.  Determining whether a farmer 
using GE seeds has a duty to neighbouring farms, the court would first look to see if it fits within 
one a previously established category.  At first glance the case appears to fit with the basic rule 
that anyone who causes harm to a person or their property is deemed to have owed that 
individual a duty of care.
101
  However, this will depend on how the courts define property 
damage: does the fact that the plants are simply altered and thus still useable rather than 
physically damaged or ruined mean they are excluded from this category?  The notion of useable 
is also contentious since the plant may no longer be „usable‟ for organic farmers for their original 
purpose; they are still nevertheless usable as commercial products, albeit at a reduced market 
value.  
If it is deemed that the plants are not damaged in the traditional sense, the courts do have 
the ability to establish new categories of duty by asking: is it reasonably foreseeable that the 
defendant‟s actions would cause harm to the particular plaintiffs?102  It seems clear that this 
should be answered in the affirmative as there is, and has been, a great deal of coverage of this 
particular risk to non GE farmers.  Moreover, the fact that many GE seed user agreements 
mandate that farmers institute practices to reduce the likelihood of cross pollination should be 
taken as proof of reasonable awareness of the risk of harm.  The larger hurdle in such a case will 
likely be in establishing that the GE farmer has fallen below the standard of care reasonably 
expected of them.  While Ryan v Victoria (City) made it clear that “mere compliance with a 
statute does not, in and of itself, preclude a finding of civil liability” 103, it may prove difficult to 
show there was actual negligence when much of the contamination may occur due to natural 
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processes like wind and pollination.  This would create a situation that would need to be 
analyzed on a case-by-case basis which could require a significant amount of resources.  Each 
plaintiff would need to establish that a neighbouring farmer failed to take adequate precautions; 
for example, if a farmer were to improperly set their buffer zones.  There is still the issue of 
causation which will be addressed later on as this is a concern shared by the other forms of civil 
law lawsuits referred to in this paper.   
 4.2 Nuisance 
Nuisance is defined as: an unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of land, 
causing either physical damage to the land or injury to the health, comfort, or convenience of the 
occupier.
104
  Unlike a negligence claim, there is no fault requirement when claiming nuisance.  
That is, a defendant can be held liable even if they have acted in a reasonable, prudent manner 
because the law is concerned about the reasonability of the action‟s consequences, not one‟s state 
of mind.  Some prime examples of nuisance cases involve: barking dogs, noise, smoke, or 
obnoxious odors.  No actual property damage is required, rather the claimant must demonstrate 
that they have lost some ability to use and enjoy their property.  The court will only intervene 
when one‟s excessive use of property causes inconvenience beyond what those in the area can 
withstand.  This requires the court to assess the standard of comfort generally enjoyed or 
expected in the area at that time.
105
 
Before a farmer wishes to pursue a nuisance claim against a GE grower, they must first 
decide if they should seek a private nuisance claim or one of public nuisance.  Public nuisance 
claims are designed for issues that hold a common interest for multiple parties; when the 
defendant‟s conduct interferes with the rights or enjoyment that are common to the community.  
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Organic and conventional farmers might wish to pursue this action together when the GE 
contamination is so widespread that it becomes unreasonable to expect one person to take 
proceedings on their own to stop it.  However, there are two major caveats that might make a 
public nuisance claim problematic.  First a public nuisance claim must be brought forward by the 
provincial Attorney General (AG).  Putting forward a lawsuit of this nature can be quite political 
and requires the AG to balance multiple policy concerns, leaving many with limited access to the 
courts.
106
  Ontario is an exception in that the Environmental Bill of Rights allows a person who 
has suffered a direct or economic loss due to a public nuisance to the environment to sue without 
permission from the AG.
107
  Secondly, if the public nuisance were to succeed and the GE farmer 
were required to either cease their activity or compensate for the public nature of their damage, 
the individual farmers would not be able to seek compensation as a private matter.  This is 
despite the fact that one farmer may have suffered to a greater degree than another farmer, 
because what is being remedied here is the damage to the „public resource‟: crop biodiversity.  
The farmer would need to demonstrate that they suffered a “peculiar and particular” damage 
rather than a difference in the extent of damage.
108
 
A nuisance claim may be plausible if the court determines that the use of GE had an 
unreasonable effect on the use of the land based on the factors enunciated in 340909 Ontario Ltd 
v Huron Steel Products Ltd.  This amounts to a type of balancing act that the adjudicators make 
by weighing the utility of the offending action (proposed benefits such as an increased yield due 
to the use of the GE trait) against the severity of the interference (how significant are the 
damages suffered by the GE contamination).  It is pure speculation in which direction the courts 
might go on this issue, given the sensitive policy considerations involved.  Is it more important to 
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preserve ecological and farming diversity or is it more important that in an ever increasing 
population, the agriculture community seek out all available means of increasing crop yield?
109
 
In determining unreasonableness the courts must also look at the „ordinary use of the 
land‟.  Some commentators have suggested that, because of the complex nature of organic 
farming, such use may be deemed “too sensitive” to be considered ordinary use of the land (in 
this case the use is meant for agriculture in general), to expect that the offending party (GE 
growers) to take responsibility for the ensuing damages caused to the organic farmers.
110
   
However I would point to the fact that organic farming is simply the natural form of agriculture 
and has always been around, albeit updated with new understanding of agroecology.  The issue 
of sensitivity is reserved for cases that would not be accepted as the norm by the broader 
community, for example, claiming the fumes of a factory interferes with one‟s ability to raise 
sheep when in fact the area is zoned for industrial use.  Additionally, organic practices are now 
an accepted form of farming throughout Canadian society. 
 4.3 Rylands v Fletcher 
 A common law rule closely related to that of private nuisance is the strict liability 
expressed in Rylands v Fletcher (1868).
111
  Judge Blackburn wrote that the rule of law is “that 
the person who for his own purpose brings onto his lands and collects and keeps there anything 
likely to do mischief if it escapes … is prima facie answerable for all damage which is the 
natural consequence of its escape.”112  This is often used in cases where toxic material has 
escaped, making those who brought the material onto their land in the first place liable.  
However, the regulators of GE material require biotechnology companies to submit data on the 
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chemical and other effects of their product, similarly in nature to the protocols in the toxic 
chemical industry.  Therefore, a simple analogous case can be drawn between the two industries 
given that the government itself has established the parallels.   
There is no defence of due diligence with this common law decree.  The rule has been 
refined somewhat however in that liability will not be found if the mischief that escapes is of an 
ordinary purpose for which the owner can reasonably expect to use their land.
113
  This idea that 
the escaped substance must be of a „non-natural use‟ to the land does not yet have a clear 
definition at law.  Farmers wishing to file a Rylands type of suit would then need to show that 
the use of GE seeds is not a natural use of the land.  The debate has two polarising stances, on 
the one side that GE is a natural extension of conventional farming while on the other hand 
genetically engineering has taken agriculture on a fundamentally new path.  When faced with 
such politically charged policy questions, the courts often reserve judgment, declaring that a 
clear intention from legislation is needed.  Given, however, the government‟s stance since the 
inception of GE in farming and the institutionalisation of SE, it may very likely be that GE 
would not be defined as unnatural within the farming context.  Legislative intent normalising GE 
farming can also be read from the fact that there has been no explicit or separate GE legislation 
established to date.  Instead, only regulatory amendments to existing legislation have been 
adopted to incorporate the expected needs of GE farming. 
 4.4 Trespass 
 Unlike nuisance, where the issue is unreasonable interference, trespass can be found on 
interference alone.  As a judge declared in a1978 case of unwanted pesticide spraying; “to throw 
a foreign substance on the property of another, and particularly in doing so to disturb his 
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enjoyment of his property, is an unlawful act. . . . 
114
  Ultimately the claimant in a trespass case 
needs to demonstrate that there has been a physical invasion of, or interference with, their 
exclusive possession of property.  Some cases have gone so far as to declare that the fact that the 
invasion was done by an invisible element, does not bar a successful trespass case.
115
  The point 
is that one‟s use of exclusive possession of the land has been affected, though courts have 
stressed that the interference needs to be more then minimal irritation. 
 Appling this law to the case of GE contamination then, it would seem likely that a farmer 
could succeed.  Though the claimant would want to show some form of damage in the way of 
lost market access or lost certification in order to recoup their losses; at law, trespass need not 
end in direct damages.  An intruder onto ones land constitutes trespass even if the only damage 
be as little as “bruising the grass and even treading upon the soil.”.116  In another case, unwanted 
mail constituted trespass.
117
 While Canada does have a cause of action for unintentional trespass, 
in which the farmer would need to point to some sort of negligence on the part of the GE farmer, 
most cases involve intentional trespass.  This, however, does not have a high threshold as 
demonstrated when the Alberta Supreme Court held in 1976 that the saw dust from a lumber 
company amounted to trespass when it interfered with the use of a neighbouring motel.
118
  
Intentional, then, may not be for the intention to trespass but rather the intention to perform the 
particular action that subsequently constitutes trespass, for example, intentionally hang electrical 
wires which subsequently pass over one‟s property,  spaying pesticides that migrate, or growing 
GE crops that drift.   
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 4.5 Causation 
 The larger issue with the above mentioned civil remedies is the problem with establishing 
causation.  With the right technology, it is possible to determine that a crop has been 
contaminated by GE plants, but the farmer may still need to demonstrate that they are not 
themselves responsible for the contamination.
119
  This is particularly relevant for framers who 
may have had prior contracts with GE developers.  Establishing that the GE plant in the 
claimant‟s field originated from a particular neighbouring field may prove to be the most 
difficult hurdle.  If there is only one such land using that exact GE crop, the court can determine 
on the bases of probability where the contamination originated from.  What happens when there 
are multiple farms using GE crops in a region? 
 In the case of negligence, the Canadian courts have recently made changes to allow for a 
more just application of the law.  In a 2001 SCC case, it was determined that  the inability to 
conclusively determine causation should not be a bar so long as the plaintiff is able to show that 
the defendants made a material contribution to the plaintiff‟s loss, at which point it is up to the 
defendant to show that they in fact did not cause the damage.
120
  This would allow a claimant to 
implicate all GE growers reasonably located in the area without having to meet the otherwise 
overly difficult causation burden.   
In the case of Trespass or nuisance however, the claimant will likely have to rely on 
circumstantial evidence such as expert testimony on wind patterns and agricultural practices that 
would make it more likely that the contamination originated from a particular field. Such 
evidence is difficult to establish and Canadian courts are reluctant to give such information much 
weight, particularly if it were the deciding point in a multi-million dollar lawsuit. 
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Add to this that “for new life forms released into the environment, it may be decades after 
the release before any impact on the ecosystem and humans is detected or fully understood,” 121 it 
may be impossible to pinpoint the source to establish causation beyond an immediate and 
concrete case. 
A final but crucial point on the matter of causation is the issue that contamination may in 
fact be ecologically inevitable.  If there are situations where there is no way to prevent gene drift, 
either through buffers or other planting practices the entire notion of causation would be 
undermined.  Such a case would mean that simply farming GE seeds itself establishes your 
liability; a form of strict liability comparable to the Rylands v Fletcher scenario above.  However 
in this case there is no one that has „allowed‟ the mischief to escape in the strict sense of the 
word.  This brings in questions of fairness since farmers have received approval from 
government officials to use the product in question, establishing its legality.  It would be 
imprudent for the courts to then turn around and deem the same governmental approved act 
responsible for inevitable damage.  This problem instead may point to a more fundamental 
problem with regulation and support the notion of regulatory liability or government negligence.  
Barriers to this cause of action are however discussed below. 
If the only farmer versus farmer commingling case in the world – Marsh vs Baxter (Sup. 
Ct. of Western Australia)
122
 – is to be taken as an indication, causation will not be found in such 
situations.  The court found that the GE farmer was not negligent as his planting was a lawful 
agricultural practice.  Furthermore, because narrowly speaking the economic loss was due to the 
de-certification of the plaintiff‟s organic status, not due to the particular harvesting practice that 
left the GE canola open to the weather, causation was not established.  The decision of the 
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certification agency to decertify parts of the plaintiff‟s yield was deemed the legal cause of his 
loss and not the conduct of the defendant.   
As a side note of (troubling) interest, the courts found that the decertification due to 
contamination was a „gross overreaction‟ on the part of the agency.  The organic farmer was told 
he should instead sue the organic certification body for the lost revenue as he would be “better 
served directing his concerns in that contractual quarter.”123  
 4.6 Changing Behaviour 
 One aspect that the above rationalisations have in common is that the cases are all 
directed towards a neighbouring farmer that has used GE seeds, not the developer or regulatory 
bodies themselves.  While not necessarily relevant to a successful verdict, if the object is to 
recoup the lost market revenue due to contamination, as a private citizen, a farmer may not have 
the “deep pockets” necessary to make good on the damages.  However, in an attempt to 
indirectly alter behaviour there may still be a legitimate reason to pursue a civil remedy against 
neighbouring farmers.  If the level of risk that individual farmers take on when purchasing GE 
seeds significantly rises, there may be a point at which the cost outweighs the potential benefits 
enough to either induce a noticeable drop in GE purchases and/or motivate the development of 
alternative farming practices that reduce potential gene flow.   
 4.7 Biotechnology Developers 
 Initiating a claim against the developers of GE products may be appealable given the 
practical reality of their financial situation puts them in the best position to compensate for the 
economic damage that gene flow creates.  For purposes of equity, this approach may also be 
appropriate as it would entail that those who benefit the most from the introduction of the new 
technology take steps to ensure that the costs of that invention do not disproportionately burden a 
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few individuals.  Finally, seeking redress against the biotech companies may allow the plaintiff 
to bypass the cumbersome issue of causation.  Indeed it is precisely the inherent problem of 
successfully proving a GE contamination case with the use of circumstantial evidence that has 
led farmers to join together in class action lawsuits against developers and the government.
124
 
 The same four cause of actions discussed above could be pursued against biotechnology 
companies and, in fact, an attempt to do so can be seen in the recent Hoffman v. Monsanto 
Canada Inc. case.
 125
  Here, organic farmers represented by the Saskatchewan Organic 
Directorate sought to litigate against both Monsanto and Bayer for the economic damage caused 
by their introduction of GE varieties of canola.  The case before the court was a preliminary 
ruling seeking to be certified as a Class Action (allowing all those harmed by the defendant‟s 
actions to be named as plaintiffs).  Given this preliminary nature, the Saskatchewan Superior 
Court had to rule on whether or not the claimants had an arguable case, whether there was any 
merit to their claims (not if that merit could amount to a successful verdict).  Unfortunately, the 
court ruled that there was no such merit to their claims for civil liability against the 
biotechnology companies.  The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal agreed and in 2007 the SCC 
denied leave to hear their case.   
In coming to this conclusion, the court felt that the defendants could not be held to owe a 
duty to the farmers in a case of negligence because they had gained all requisite government 
approvals before the release of their product;
126
 shifting any possible blame of negligence to the 
regulators and away from the manufactures.  Furthermore, the damage claimed in their 
negligence suit was not deemed suitable.  The organic farmers sought to have their lost revenue, 
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due to Europe‟s ban on GE canola, acknowledged, however the court felt that any EU policy 
directed at GE imports was directed at the biotechnology itself not against organic farmers 
inadvertently contaminated and thus the policy was not relevant in the present situation.
127
   
 The court left alone the issue of GE drift as a „dangerous substance‟ or that it is an 
“unnatural” use of land as required under the Rylands v Fletcher rule because again the court felt 
the biotechnology companies are shielded by the fact that the „escape‟ of the contaminants was 
done through lawful commercial practices approved by the government.
128
   
 In both the nuisance and trespass cause of actions, the commercial or marketing nature of 
the biotech company‟s role was emphasised.  The courts deemed that while their role as 
„marketers‟ or „sellers‟ is needed for the damage to occur, it is ultimately the neighbouring 
farmers that put the nuisance in play.
129
  This seems like a particularly troubling finding if it were 
to become a precedent as it essentially holds that the biotechnology companies can absolve their 
actions in creating a hazard by relying on their end use role as a business; shifting the burden of 
responsibility to individual farmers. 
 However, the case is not entirely closed as there may still be some avenues to explore.  
While the court dismissed the manufacturers‟ duty to non-GE farmers due to their fulfilment of 
regulatory obligations, other courts have made it clear that this ought not to be a decisive 
factor.
130
  Negligence in product design could still be found if one were to show that the product 
was designed negligently and in Canada such an approach often takes on a „risk-utility‟ balance 
analysis.  Some factors the court may look to in answering this question “the usefulness or 
desirability of the product; the availability of other and safer products to meet the same need; the 
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likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness; the obviousness of the danger” among others.131  
Whether this balancing act weighs in favour of the organic farmers is not at issue when deciding 
if a case has merit, instead the court would need to ask whether it is possible to make this 
argument of negligent design.  Furthermore, the negligence claim in the Hoffman case was also 
dismissed because the plaintiffs sought pure economic damages due to their inability to use 
canola in their crop rotations and their inability to partake in the certified organic market.  
Generally speaking, courts do not accept claims for pure economic losses (though Canadian 
courts have acknowledged some exceptions to this category and have left open the possibility 
that other forms could be recognized in the future).
132
  However damages framed as a loss of 
revenue due to damaged crops (ie. damage to property) should be acceptable to the courts as it 
follows the traditional pattern of common law damages.  This would cover the amount of money 
one losses when an organic farmer is forced to sell their crop at a loss to the general market due 
to contamination. 
The Hoffman ruling on trespass is also questionable in its thoroughness, given that the 
Schmeiser case itself inadvertently showed that it is possible to trespass on one‟s intellectual 
property after one‟s role as marketer has ended.  If a biotechnology company can acknowledge 
that they own and can protect their property subsequent to its release to the original purchaser, 
they likewise owe a duty to ensure that such property does not unintentionally find itself in a 
position to claim trespass.  One ought not to be able to claim ownership of property in order to 
satisfy one form of trespass (patent infringement) but relinquish claims of ownership in the 
trespass case at hand. 
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4.8 Governmental Negligence 
Finding a government body negligent is particularly difficult as only the „operational‟ 
aspects of their work rather than any „policy‟ component is open to judicial review.133  Defining 
something as operational or policy can then become very contentious.  The issues most likely to 
be attacked as negligent behaviour by the government are the lack of economic and social 
considerations in the assessment process and the adoption of SE over a more precautionary 
principled approach.  Both of these are likely however to be deemed as policy decisions.
134
  Jane 
Glenn however claims that the undue influence the biotechnology companies have on the 
regulatory system, as described above, and the lack of transparency, are far more operational in 
nature and may be cause for a negligence claim.
135
  However, as pointed out by Thomas Moran, 
these claims are stymied by the fact that they can only be recognized when there is a sufficiently 
close (proximate)  relationship established between the individual claimant and the regulator.
136
  
Assigning statutory responsibilities and determining how to report on those responsibilities 
would unlikely garner this type of relationship. 
 Lawsuits against GE regulators in the US have been successful in finding that the USDA 
failed to address “environmental risks, including the risk of GM crop contamination and 
potentially the eventual destruction of organic alfalfa in the region.”137  The USDA was deemed 
to not be incompliance with statutory regulations.  Similarly one might argue that the Canadian 
regulators have not complied with the Seeds Act with their particular methods of data collection 
and review process.  However this would not likely result in a finding of negligence but rather a 
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successful judicial review application
138
 which at most would allow for an injunction until a 
proper assessment is completed. 
4.9 Final thoughts on Common Law Remedies 
 Despite the fact that the Canadian government has proclaimed that the private classical 
tort remedies will suffice, and thus new legislation determining a new cause of action for 
contamination is unnecessary, there seems to very little room for a plaintiff to successfully 
pursue a suit, let alone recoup his lost earnings.
139
  If we are to take the court‟s ruling in Hoffman 
as a sound precedent, the most successful brought will likely be to seek a nuisance or trespass 
claim against a neighbouring farmer that has used GE plants.  A significant number of successful 
claims like this could, however, also wreak havoc on individual farmers seeking out a living by 
using this new technology or on the wider agricultural community if this expense is to be 
absorbed by farmers alone.  While other areas of negligent suits, such as in the course of 
transport, may be feasible as well, the same issue of redress is present.  Finding a defendant with 
„deep pockets‟, who can also address the pervasiveness of the issue of contamination, is 
challenging. 
 There are other reasons, other than the mere complexity and resource draining process of 
seeking out individual court case remedies, why legislation should be drafted to contend with the 
issue of gene drift.  The courts have a great deal of expertise, particularly in terms of 
constitutional rights, however, there are some cases that are simply not judiciable or are better 
left to parliament.  Courts often recognise the highly politicalised and policy driven nature of a 
particular matter and in turn withhold judgment until clear parliament intent is received.  GE 
contamination appears to be such a case.  The policy implications of a successful civil suit 
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against a biotech company would be tremendous and unlikely the appropriate venue for the 
independent, unelected judiciary to step in.  Furthermore, given the contentious nature of this 
matter, what is actually sought is some form of compromise which is not the objectives of an 
adversarial judiciary system.  Instead, parliamentary debate relying on an evidently biased 
analysis process would be more suitable for such an initiative. 
5. Analysis of Liability Laws in other Jurisdictions 
 Before analysing what the most appropriate system would be in the Canadian context, 
this paper will give an overview of the type of regulatory and liability frameworks already in 
play or under review internationally, regionally and domestically.  The rationales for these 
different approaches will be briefly addressed in relation to their designers, but a more thorough 
analysis of the ramifications of the various considerations in a liability scheme will be addressed 
later.  While most countries have enacted some form of statute that addresses the regulation of 
genetically modified material, most have done so from a health and safety perspective to address 
public concerns.
140
  Although actions to address these concerns are valid and necessary, it can 
pose difficulties when determining if these acts and regulation will also apply to private 
economic losses.  Some states have attempted to address these private financial issues with 
specific legislation, while others have tended to use broad language that may encompass these 
claims when the charge arises.  
Multilateral environmental agreements mostly deal with the issue of liability through a 
specific coordinated civil regime.  Some past models include: the Paris and Vienna Conventions 
on nuclear liability; the 1992 Protocol amending the International Convention on Civil Liability 
for Oil Pollution Damage; and the 1999 Basle Convention.  These regimes still allow for claims 
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to be brought to the national court system, however, the rules and substantive standards applied 
are the same for all signatory countries.
141
  The national and international legal tests for redress 
are harmonized amongst the countries. However, as will be seen below, this trend has yet to 
carry over to GE liability regulations.  The biggest barriers to a harmonized approach appears to 
be the fear that such regulations will impact additional domestic indemnity laws that could have 
significant financial repercussions as well as undermine national sovereignty. 
5.1 International Liability Schemes 
At the international level, the most prominent regulatory framework has been the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity that entered into 
force in September 2003.  With the support of the EU and a majority of developing nations, the 
Cartagena Protocol aims to manage the transboundary movement, transit, handling and use of 
all living modified organisms that pose an adverse effect on the sustainable use of biological 
diversity, while factoring in risks to human health.
142
  While some have commented that this 
avenue promises to be the best option for those in developing nations to address their concerns 
over GE commercialisation,
143
 the biggest GE producers and exporting nations have yet to fully 
incorporate the protocol into national regulatory schemes.  The USA has declined to sign the 
protocol. While Canada has shown initial interest by signing it, steps towards ratification have 
not begun.
144
   
 The protocol makes it clear that overseeing the use and transit of GE products should be 
done "in accordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of the Rio 
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Declaration on Environment and Development".
145
  Principal 15 explains that in cases where 
threats of serious or irreversible damage are evident, the lack of full scientific certainty should 
not be used as an excuse to avoid cost-effective measures in order to prevent environmental 
degradation.  Articles 10.6 and 11.8 of the Cartagena Protocol explain the implementation of the 
precautionary principle in relation to handling GE, stating that insufficient relevant scientific 
information on a GE product, concerning the extent of the potentially adverse effects on 
biodiversity, should not stand in the way of a party to the protocol rejecting or otherwise 
affecting the importation of such a product. 
During agreement negotiations, one of the more contentious issues involved the type of 
liability and redress system the protocol would endorse in the event that a GE product, moving 
across boundaries, did indeed trigger in the importing nation some damage to the environment or 
to human health.
146
  Article 27 allowed for the initiation of negotiations on this issue; to 
determine the international rules concerning liability and redress.  To this affect, the Nagoya-
Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol was adopted on October 15, 2010.
147
  While this may be 
a good initial framework for liability, there are some potential concerns and legislative gaps that 
may need to be addressed to allow for a comprehensive framework for private economic loss.   
Given the protocol‟s focus on biological diversity, it isn‟t even clear if personal economic 
damage is specifically contemplated.  The rules pertaining to redress include response measures 
to reduce or prevent damages and to restore biological diversity, either “to the condition that 
existed before the damage occurred or its nearest equivalent.”148  However, no mention of 
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compensation for the loss in market value or livelihood is mentioned.  In fact, no financial 
securities were agreed upon.  Secondly, damage would be assessed only in cases where it 
involves GE products in cross-border exchanges (thus not covering containment disputes born 
from domestic initiatives).  Moreover, the test establishing contamination liability mandates that 
the claimant prove a measurable and significant adverse effect on biological diversity or risks to 
human health.
149
  How „significant‟ is defined has yet to be determined.  This lingering 
ambiguity is no doubt due to the difficulty of negotiating such terms with such a large and 
diverse number of parties, which is perhaps why the ad hoc committee has encouraged those 
states party to the protocol to address liability through existing national civil liability 
frameworks.
150
 
5.2 Multinational Liability Schemes 
As briefly mentioned above, the EU works under the precautionary principle when 
assessing GE products.  After accepting this principle in 1991, the EU placed a de facto 
moratorium on GE approvals, but in 2013 the EU General Court determined that delay tactics 
within their approval process amounted to a violation of the law. With mounting WTO pressure 
due to perceived violations of international trade laws, the moratorium was lifted.
151
 
There are a number of regional conventions designed to address damage due to GE 
release, most introduced by the EU.  The Directive on Deliberate Release into the Environment 
of GMOs establishes rules for risk assessments and procedures for cultivating crops to decrease 
the likelihood of contamination, but stops short of introducing a liability regime, instead 
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encouraging seed suppliers and farmers to inform themselves about applicable national liability 
laws.
152
  The EU Liability Directive deals with product liability, including agricultural products, 
however this would only apply in situations where the seeds planted were deemed not „fit for 
their purpose”153.  This would not be the case if sold in accordance with state regulations.  Land 
contamination would also only be considered if it adversely affects human health or is within a 
protected habitat.
154
  The European parliament initially advocated for the inclusion of private 
liability through a Coexistence Report which aimed to create “Community-wide civil liability 
and insurance in respect of possible financial damage in connection with coexistence”155 but this 
was not included in the final EU Liability Directive.  Germany and the United Kingdom, in 
particular, opposed the language as it could impact their domestic insurance and compensation 
schemes.
156
   
The Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from 
Activities Dangerous to the Environment, or “the Lugano Convention”, would have overcome 
many of the above issues as it specifically included risk to property and allows for a strict 
liability framework; however the protocol is not legally binding because of a lack of 
signatories.
157
 
The Organization for African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), along with the 
Ethiopian Environmental Protection Authority, created an African Model Law on Safety in 
Biotechnology in 2001.  Not strictly a regional framework, it was designed to help establish 
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consistent national laws on biotechnology.
158
  The initial model included a strict liability regime 
“for any harm caused by such a genetically modified organism”.159  Harm specifically included 
damage to the economy, social or cultural practices of the indigenous communities which 
extended to “damage to agricultural systems, reduction in yields and damage to the economy of 
an area or community.”160  Several African national governments have subsequently established 
biosafety laws based on the model but have not adopted its strict liability regime. 
5.3 Regulating Liability on a National Level 
When examining regulatory frameworks developed by national governments, it becomes 
clear that many have recognised the uniqueness of GE claims, and this has prompted discussion 
about special liability regimes.
161
  Many European states are, however, electing to establish 
minimum protection through the more traditional tort law system.  This approach may be due to 
the fact that GE farming, at least until recently, has been more of an exception in Europe rather 
than the norm, as it is in North America.  This less frequent use of GE farming can ultimately 
affect the number and nature of claims brought forward and consequently means that there is not 
as great of a need or pressure on the EU governments to institute a robust system at this time. 
 There are multiple ways assessment regulations can impact liability and contamination; 
however, civil liability remedies, particularly for economic lose due to contamination, have 
largely been dealt with outside the assessment framework through stand-alone statutory 
instruments.  How these instruments operate will be reviewed below (Section 5.4). 
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5.3.1 Approval Process 
Through the assessment process countries can address issues of liability by limiting 
cultivation and thus comingling; factoring in what level of risk/hardship due to contamination is 
beyond acceptable for an application to be approved; diversifying the type of regulatory bodies 
permitted to make decisions on the approvals and expanding the scope of what is regulated and 
thus monitored for contamination. 
The approval and use of GE products is of great public concern in many countries and 
several governments have consequently established strict risk and permit regulations limiting 
cultivation.  The assessment process differs from state to state.  Some countries, such as New 
Zealand, have an Environmental Protection Authority that is required to take into account 
environmental, economic, social, cultural, and public health considerations
162
, while in South 
Africa, the decision to include an assessment of the socio-economic risks is a policy decision 
made by the Executive Council on a case-by-case basis.
163
  Countries that have adopted the 
European regulations may find themselves constrained, as they are not permitted to ban GE 
crops all together.  The EU mandates that all laws passed by the member states be subordinate to 
the EU‟s regulations regarding consumer and environmental protection.164  Russia, exempt from 
such restrictions, had in fact implemented a ban on the commercial cultivation of GE products all 
together, though this has was changed as of 2013 with the adoption of a resolution to allow for 
an approvals process.
165
  Though most countries have not gone so far as to ban the cultivation of 
GE plants, the actual plantings remain low.  This may be in part due to the more stringent 
application of assessment requirements, but also a result of heightened political sensitivity 
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surrounding the issue in many countries.  For example, Japan permits the cultivation of GE 
crops, but other than ornamental flowers, no GE crops have been planted due to the public‟s 
wariness of its safety.
166
 
 Despite the variances in containment practices, most national governments still oversee 
the assessment rules for conducting experiments of GE.  This allows them to take into 
consideration factors and risks that directly lead to contamination in the granting or not granting 
of approval.  Italy, for example, includes the consideration of possible abandonment or 
replacement of crops that are no longer economically viable due to GE, or a change in market 
patterns due to the product release or damage to the image of local products.
167
  France is another 
example of an EU country that has chosen to implement more stringent regulations on the release 
of GE that may include issues of containment.  The government‟s approval process includes 
looking at risks to the environment and public health, by soliciting the opinion of the Haut 
Conseil des biotechnologies.  The Conseil has both a scientific committee and one addressing 
economic, ethical, and social matters.
168
  When considering risks to the environment, the Haut 
Conseil looks to the Environmental Code which includes a provision that GMOs be used “in a 
manner that respects the environment and public health, agricultural structures, local 
ecosystems”.169  By explicitly factoring in how the introduction of a new GE plant will impact 
agricultural arrangements and local ecosystems, the state is suggesting that if the current 
diversity is threatened too much, an approval should be withheld, thereby eliminating the 
opportunity for co-mingling. 
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While GE regulations are often implemented by the central governments, where there are 
strict federalist rules that govern agriculture, as in Italy, a more diversified approach can emerge.  
The Italian Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the Federal 2005 law that required 
“equality between different types of agriculture” and imposed on the “autonomous provinces a 
„plan of coexistence‟ to prevent the commingling of GE and non-GE products.170  The twenty 
regional governments have the freedom to impose their own rules concerning containment so 
long as they remain bounded by the European rules.  In Sweden, some municipalities have gone 
so far as to declare themselves GMO-free regions.  However because the licences for GE 
cultivation are given out by the Swedish Board of Agriculture at the national level, there is no 
legal basis for these municipal claims.
171
  Instead the municipality must reach a voluntary 
agreement with their local farmers to maintain GMO-free status.  As a result, these multi-tiered 
approaches mean that liability can be addressed at multiple points and contexts. 
The definition of GE within a country can have an effect on how or what gets assessed.  
As mentioned above, Canada (and the USA) have chosen to streamline their assessments based 
on the notion of „novel traits‟, thus capturing some products that were not manipulated using 
rDNA technology while performing a superficial assessment on some that have been created 
with the technology.  Sweden defines a GMO as “an organism where the genetic material has 
been altered in a way that does not happen naturally through mating or natural  
recombination.”172  This would capture all first generation rDNA technology products.  Germany 
goes one step further in defining a GMO as also one that has “come into existence through 
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mating or natural recombination between a GMO and a non-GM organism”.173  This is 
particularly important for co-existence as it means that accidentally contaminated plants will also 
become subject to the Genetic Engineering Act.  These contaminated plants would then be 
deemed to contravene this act as they do not hold a valid permit which has led the court to order 
that such crops be destroyed.
174
  These different approaches to defining GE allow for differences 
in what is regulated and therefore captured in the monitoring process, including monitoring for 
contamination risks. 
5.3.2 Labeling and Thresholds 
Imported GE products are often not captured by these assessment regulations, as the acts 
tend to focus on domestic release.  Even countries that have the most stringent policies, like 
Germany and Japan, continue to be significant importers of GE foods and feed.  The regulatory 
frameworks in these countries are focused on plants rather than foods and feed which are the 
processed results of plants.   
Instead of assessment regulations, rules pertaining to labeling and testing tend to be 
firmly in place in these countries to ensure that contaminated products are not inadvertently sold 
as natural.  The EU has set a threshold of GE material in a food item at 0.9% and anything below 
this point need not force the food to be labelled as containing GE.  Germany has a voluntary 
measure that allows producers to label their products as GE-free if there is no trace of GE 
material.
175
  Japan requires labeling of all GE products, whether they are substantially equivalent 
or not; whether they have the same compositions or nutritional value as their conventional 
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counterparts or not.
176
  Products in South Korea must have an “eye catching” label stating that it 
does or possibly does contain genetically modified food.
177
  
What this means in terms of liability is that damages can be more readily calculated, at 
least for pure economic loss.  Loss for alterations to the land itself or clean up fees should also be 
fairly easily calculated as separate heads of damages and do not rely on regulatory compliance.  
Russia recently implemented a monetary liability for violating labeling laws that are too vague or 
misleading on GE foods.
178
  Canadian farmers that are exporting contaminated products to these 
countries may induce GE labeling and lose their price premiums.  This financial loss is not just 
for organics because, unlike in Canada, these labelling frameworks put the onus of identification 
and marking on GE producers.  This head of damages can be significant in nations where 
labeling is mandatory.  Such inconstancy may also leave open the issue of how to calculate 
damages since a contaminated crop will be valued differently if it was for export versus 
domestic, local sale. 
 Technical requirements to reduce the risk of contamination also differ between countries, 
however, the basic requirement of keeping a distance or „buffer‟ between GE and non-GE crops 
is found in most countries, albeit at different measurements.  Sweden requires fifty meters 
between GMO and non-GMO corn and three meters between GMO and non-GMO potatoes,
179
 
whereas Germany mandates that GE maize be grown at least one hundred fifty meters from 
conventional maize and three hundred meters from organic maize.
180
 These figures may be based 
on individual crop contamination vulnerabilities and specific wind patterns in the country. 
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However these vulnerabilities are calculated by the assessors, based on their interpretation of the 
field study data which is then correlated to the land use conditions. 
5.4 Post-Assessment Regulatory Instruments 
Pre-release risk assessments may take into consideration the difficulty of co-existence in 
various forms but despite the technical requirements and „best agricultural practices‟, it is 
recognized that some contamination will occur once cultivation begins.  Generally in these 
circumstances, the EU aims to espouse the principle that the polluter must compensate for the 
damage they create but ultimately the national governments can chose if and how to implement a 
specific liability scheme for damage caused by GE contamination.  Below is a summary of some 
of the main model types or features that a nation can contemplate when establishing a framework 
that encapsulates the unique qualities of GE cultivation.  These statutory instruments are post-
assessment, meaning that they are contemplated and implemented outside the approvals 
regulatory framework.  At times the framework may appear as though it were an afterthought by 
the regulators; a system to manage an oversight during the assessment process.  Of those who 
have established some mechanism, some states have elected to pursue an entirely private, market 
solution which sits outside the GE regulatory regime, but more often, states have made an 
attempt to integrate the finding of liability within the overall administration of GE management. 
 Many countries, particularly in the EU, have found their traditional tort liability case law 
inadequate in dealing with GE claims. This has prompted several countries to put forward a 
combination of traditional tort liabilities, along with a specific GE civil liability statute.  
Governments have generally opted for either a strict, no-fault, insurance or compensatory fund 
scheme; the latter two have been contemplated both as state run and as (at least partially) 
privately run systems.  A brief description of each of these options follows. 
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  5.4.1 Civil Liability Statutes 
 Those choosing a system of strict liability are making a clear indication that they are 
sceptical or concerned about the new biotechnology.
181
  Strict liability eliminates the need for a 
claimant to prove that the one releasing the GE material has done so negligently or in error.  
Irrespective of following proper segregation protocols or any other wrongdoing, strict liability 
holds those in possession of the material causing mischief as the culpable party simply for 
initiating the „consequences‟.  Traditionally the tort liability framework was based on the notion 
that an individual who played some part in falling below the expected standard of care should be 
held accountable for the consequences: fault based liability.  This left those who could not point 
directly at a wrongdoer for their particular loss, either because of technical difficulties or because 
there was no one to point to, in the case of unfortunate accidents lacking remedy, without 
recourse.  The idea of finding individual or subjective fault has since shifted to a more objective 
standard of care: an acceptance that there can be an “objective duty to compensate the unwanted 
consequences of one‟s conduct.”182  This duty is grounded on the basis “that responsibility has to 
be assumed as a counterpart of the privilege to create (and maintain) a situation of increased 
risk.”183  By reducing the causation burden, this approach then would obligate a party to the act 
of GE development to compensate the loss suffered due to contamination, a significant burden 
which may discourage the use of GE in the first place.  The level of compensation would be 
based on how the damage is defined in legal terms.  In a case like Nigeria, where the strict 
liability Act specifies that the compensated damage shall include: personal injury, damage to 
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property and financial loss, one can imagine the type of chill effect this can have on the 
biotechnology industry.
184
  
 The magnitude of the compensatory duty may be mitigated by allowing certain defences.  
Common defences include human, third-party or natural interventions.  If the defendant is able to 
demonstrate that the actual harm was suffered because of an intervening factor, like the claimant 
themselves or natural forces
185
, then their own liability can be reduced.
186
  If it was not possible 
to ascertain that an actual risk was present at the outset of the technology‟s use, the defendant 
would likely be able to use the „development risk‟ defence.  However, given the scientific 
uncertainty of biotechnology, such a defence should not have much merit in a GE contamination 
claim.  This is particularly true if one is applying the precautionary principle.  Finally a statute of 
limitations is a common defence to strict liability rules; barring a claim after a certain time has 
passed in order to allow for there to be some predictability in the legal system and future 
business dealings.  The level of one‟s compensatory duty can further be limited if the state sets a 
cap to the amount of damage one can recover.
187
  In Austria, the applicant and defendant must 
attend a conciliation body for settlement negotiations before court proceedings may be 
initiated.
188
  While not a direct limit on compensation, such steps can act to reduce overall costs 
and procedural burdens. 
 Who ultimately is responsible for the compensation payments can also vary depending on 
where the state decides to draw the line along the fault-based/strict liability spectrum.  In the 
traditional model, those who are deemed blameworthy will be responsible.  Strict liability 
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statutes tend to set the neighbouring GE farmers as liable for the consequences of gene drift; 
however, there are cases, such as the Swiss liability system, where those who have received 
authorization to release the GE products, are  responsible for payment; leaving the GE farmers 
off the hook.
189
 This came about from a lengthy legislative debate that resulted in a compromise 
between the biotechnology companies and the consumer NGOs who agreed that there would be 
no moratorium on GE crops but to go with the privilege, there would be a strong liability 
regime.
190
 
5.4.2 Insurance Schemes 
 An insurance scheme also acknowledges the objective duty to compensate for loss 
suffered but allows those involved to pool their resources and then to be spread amongst the 
individuals affected by the risk.  Given this pooling, it may be that the claimant can secure a 
larger sum of money then if one were to pursue a claim directly against the individual duty-
bearer.
191
  However, given the uncertainties with a GE-specific insurance scheme, there appears 
to be a lack of such insurance products readily available.
192
  Private insurance schemes are still in 
their infancy as the research for creating a marketable portfolio is limited by difficulties in 
„testing‟ the product.  Due to these unknown variables, those that have included GE insurance 
claims in their portfolios (state run or private) have set clear limitations as to the types and 
amounts of damage that can be claimed and who qualifies as a legitimate claimant.  At a 
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minimum, an insurance scheme in Europe would exclude damages of contamination below the 
0.9% labeling threshold,
193
 as measurable damage below this point would be extremely difficult.  
Certainly this system has the potential to reduce the adversarial nature of a traditional GE 
tort/statutory liability system since the claimants could make a direct application to the insurance 
body rather seeking out neighbouring farmers. 
 Though limited as of yet, private insurance schemes have been developed to either be 
purchased by the GE-farmers themselves, or as a type of „pre-emptive-loss‟ insurance that is 
available for the farmers that feel they may be in jeopardy (similar to crop insurance for say 
drought).  There are however, insurance schemes that the state gets involved in as the guarantor, 
as seen in Germany.  Given the above mentioned significant financial penalties involved, GE 
farmers are required to purchase government-backed insurance coverage.
194
 Either way, the 
ultimate payer is arguably the consumer as these premiums would be passed on in food prices.  
Despite the fact that the cost of establishing and facilitating an insurance scheme such as this 
would be substantial, the GE farmers would likely pay less overall than if they are directly liable 
since the cost is spread across all users of the technology.  
5.4.3 Compensatory Fund 
 Allowing victims to draw money from a common compensatory fund would also have 
similar benefits to that of an insurance scheme.  Analogous legal limits would also need to be 
applied to ensure the resources were utilized in an equitable or efficient manner.  Here the 
question becomes focused on objectively qualifying the damage rather than establishing a causal 
link to liability.  Defining the damage to be covered becomes crucial.  This approach should 
utilize the least amount of administrative work since the victims and procedural limits are 
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defined at the outset.
195
  There is also the option to form such an arrangement from a bottom-up 
approach as has been done in Denmark where those who risk liability have negotiated a type of 
contract compensation agreement with surrounding neighbours.
196
  In the Netherlands, this 
voluntary scheme has become a nationwide program that involves the state as regulator and 
stakeholder.
197
 
 A compensatory scheme could also be envisioned with multiple payees, even more so 
than an insurance scheme.  There is the state-run compensation fund as seen in Slovenia which 
uses general tax dollars to alleviate farmers‟ loss due to contamination.198  However, more 
common is to have the GE farmers and related stakeholders pay into the fund in order to 
indemnify themselves.  In the Netherlands, even the potential victims - the organic farmers - 
contribute to the fund.
199
  Portugal has levied a type of green seed tax on all GE seed producers 
which is added to the overall endowment.
200
  The unknown risk level, however, makes the fund 
vulnerable in that the funds may run out before all claims can be settled.  This is particularly so 
in cases where the compensation arrangement is set up as a temporary solution to a larger 
liability scheme. 
5.4.4 Penalties 
A final note about how the schemes can envision different types of repercussions for 
those that do not abide by the rules.  There have been a number of different approaches countries 
have taken in regards to the punishments; a few going so far as to impose criminal penalties for 
contravening their national GE Act.  For example, the French Minister of Agriculture can impose 
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technical requirements, such as distances between crops, which are punishable with fines and 
penal sentences of up to two years if they are not adhered to (though specific distances have yet 
to be established).
201
 The Netherlands allows for a criminal penalty of up to six years if someone 
is found acting in violation of the licencing agreement.
202
  However, what is important to note is 
that these penalties are not for the contamination itself but the seemingly negligent practices that 
increase the risk of contamination.  Penal sanctions for the occurrence of contamination itself, 
while one has followed all regulatory procedures, would undoubtedly be an unjustified 
infringement on ones liberty as the „offence‟ involves natural wind and pollination cycles. 
Though as discussed in an earlier chapter, this is a huge weakness of the regimes themselves. 
Some states have, however, allowed for monetary penalties for the contamination of 
neighbouring farms irrespective of the cause.  Germany may have one of the most stringent 
systems in place, placing significant financial risks on any GE farmer; inciting the German 
Farmer‟s Association to recommend against the cultivation of GM plants altogether given the 
significant risk of liability.
203
  GE farmers can find themselves liable for the loss of an entire 
harvest due to contamination, as it must be destroyed and cannot even be sold at a reduced rate 
on the market.  If the contamination is not detected until it has been converted into food, the 
producer that is presumed to have caused the contamination will be responsible for the reduction 
in commercial value owing to its mandated „GMO‟ label. 204 
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An injunction against the „offending‟ party is also a common penalty that an applicant 
can seek.  In Austria a framer can petition to have the cultivation of GE crops in an adjoining 
land stopped if they can show that the area is not normally used in this manner.
205
 
6. Setting out Applicable Assessment Criteria for Canada’s GE Liability Model   
Government regulation of GE development and its subsequent release into the 
environment has been done in accordance with its “public interest” status, that is, the regulation 
is seen as essential for the effective functioning of the Canadian society and economy.  Issues 
pertaining to health and safety, the environment, social policy and the economy are generally 
categorized as constituting a public interest mandating that the government intervene, most often 
through traditional regulation but increasingly, through other policy instruments.  It has been 
Canada‟s objective to take advantage of the economic opportunities or efficiencies that 
biotechnology makes possible but the government (can) also intervene on other grounds “to 
achieve citizens social, environmental and cultural objectives”.206  Despite the claim that the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency regulates GE production according to strict scientific 
evidence, the GE regulatory system is already embedded with a number of normative, non-
scientific considerations.
207
  Determining if this subjective analysis meets the needs of a robust 
GE liability scheme will be the focus of the following section. 
 In order to assess if the government has fulfilled its obligation to effectively govern in 
accordance with public interest commitments, I seek an assessment framework that includes 
elements of both ecological integrity and policy management with a particular focus on ethical 
considerations.  The ideal framework will be one that ensures a type of equitable obligation 
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which is based on ethical or moral concerns.  The Environmental Commissioner of Ontario has 
also stated that the absence of ethical considerations would be a major oversight in the pursuit of 
appropriate agricultural governance.
208
  Equitable liability is a term often associated with tax law 
where policy considerations are used to create a type of „safety valve‟ in the tax system. It is 
meant for people who have struggled with the system and despite legally obligations to pay a 
liability; the actual, or justifiable liability, has no relation to what is being demanded at law.
209
  
The most basic level is when someone owes more due to their inability to submit their return on 
time due to extraneous circumstances.  In such situations, the governing equitable system would 
determine the scope of scenarios that are permitted for an exception from the black letter of the 
law.  Indeed, courts of equity were established as far back as the 1400s for the sole purpose of 
determining policy rationales deemed important enough to allow for alternate or more 
discretionary judicial outcomes that respond to changing social contexts.  In the current context, 
the term „equitable liability‟ will be referring to policy concerns that ought to be taken into 
consideration when determining what an effective and sustainably managed GE liability system 
may look like. 
The second branch of equitable liability, as used in my research, would look at ecological 
concerns.  While public liability should manage this issue, there may be opportunities to include 
ecological concerns within private liability as well.  Using an ecological lens, particularly a 
socio-ecological approach, is important given the impact that the changing environment ought to 
have on decision makers‟ notions of management.  Ecological indicators that quantify or explain 
complex systems in a manner that demonstrates how the environment is changing can have 
important implications on the policy review phase of policy management. 
                                                          
208
 Dowling, Dianne. (2014). “Groups Welcome Ontario Environmental Commissioner‟s Call for Action on GE 
Alfalfa.” National Farmers Union. 
209
 Tax Faculty Team. (2009). “Equitable liability is here to stay.” ICAEW. 
60 
 
6.1 Principles 
 Two main principles will ground the following analysis, namely, the precautionary 
principle and the polluter pays principle.  Both of these are grounded in Canadian law and need 
to be taken into consideration when dealing with regulating the biotech industry.  The recent case 
of Castonguay Blasting Ltd. v. Ontario (Environment)
210
 reaffirmed the precautionary principle, 
going so far as to state that a precautionary reporting approach is necessary in cases where there 
is no obvious environmental damage but instead potential property damage.  In situations where 
contamination does not result in physical damage tied to known categories of environmental 
liability, but may pose a loss to property (one‟s marketable crop), the precautionary principle 
insinuated in this case would suggest that one is still obligated to compensate, or at a minimum 
report, for that potential loss.  The precautionary principle obliges the government to “consider 
not only the information that it has on the risks involved in commercialisation but also the 
absence of information and the potential consequences of proceeding where the implications are 
uncertain or unknown”.211  In terms of a liability scheme, this may mandate a robust system if 
uncertainties relating to co-existence exist.   
The polluter pays principle is likewise enshrined in Canadian case law.  In 2003, the 
Supreme Court of Canada endorsed the Polluter Pays principle as nearly universal in Canadian 
jurisdictions in Imperial Oil v Quebec.
212
  Applying this principle to the case of GE crop 
commercialisation, the IFOAM put forward that “those who benefit from their commercialisation 
cannot pass the risk or burden of contamination on to non-GM agriculture or to citizens at large. 
If costs are incurred through the pollution of non-GM crops or the environment or through 
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unforeseen threats to human health, those financially benefiting from the commercialisation of 
the GM crops should meet those costs.”213  The polluters pay concept here suggests that those 
who benefit (i.e. developers and producers) from GE seeds are responsible for costs not because 
they are polluting in the strict definition of the term but rather are contributing to a harm, or at 
least the risk of harm, that is born by other parties.  The polluters pay concept at the core is about 
fairness: one ought not to levy the costs, either individual or societal, on those who do not 
manifestly benefit by the introduction of the new technology.  
6.2 Assessment Criteria 
To determine if the current regulation allows for a liability system that holds those who 
benefit from the release of GE seeds accountable for damages, and that the framework 
delineating how compensation can be accessed embodies a precautionary approach, a nuanced 
assessment framework must be established.  Experiences of various scholars have led to the 
insight that complex environmental problems like climate change and biodiversity loss cannot be 
analyzed with singular disciplinary approaches alone. They have to be dealt with in an 
integrative, interdisciplinary way that considers the interaction between social and ecological 
systems.
214
  Since I am looking at both the economic efficiency of the liability model and the 
public interest that the system espouses to uphold, the assessment criteria will need to include 
both an ecological approach as well as a policy assessment framework.  The ecological 
assessment criteria used in this paper will be the social-ecological systems framework designed 
by Elinor Ostrom.  This framework attempts to determine what type of organisational 
arrangement allows for a sustainable outcome in complex systems involving social and 
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ecological systems.
215
  Assessing the liability framework from a policy perspective, I will modify 
the model proposed by the OECD regulatory policy division aimed at assessing alternative 
methods to traditional regulations.
216
  The SESF will be more suitable for and directed towards 
reviewing how the GE approvals regulations meet the needs of a sustainable liability framework 
while the OECD policy assessment will help identify recommendations for the type of liability 
system that should be enacted.   
6.2.1 Social-Ecological Systems Criteria for Analysis 
 Elinor Ostrom‟s framework focuses on the interactions of humans and institutions within 
particular ecosystems in an attempt to maintain long-term sustainable resource yields.  The 
various stewardship practices analysed with this framework recognize how societies have 
developed different formal or informal arrangements to managing various natural resources and 
have found many cases that have succeeded in avoiding ecosystem collapse.
217
  The natural 
resource management in these situations refers to the management of natural resources such 
as irrigation systems, soil, plants or animals, while focusing on how the institutions affect both 
the quality of life and the ecological integrity for current as well as future generations.  Her 
studies demonstrated the importance of viewing these social-ecological systems from a 
multidimensional point of view, focusing on the interactions between humans/policy and the 
environment.  She advocates against any singular remedy for all social-ecological system 
problems.
218
  Instead she puts forward a polycentric approach, where the primary or essential key 
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management decisions are made relatively close to the actual socio-ecological occurrences and 
involving the actors as often as possible.
219
 
This approach has been largely used to examine self-governing systems of common pool 
ecosystems such as the management of forestry or fisheries.  However, this approach should also 
be suitable for the current context, to explain the level of sustainable management in GE/non-GE 
farming.  Instead of the traditional common pool scenario where one is removing resources, here 
the actors are inputting material (but still exploiting a resource) in a manner that almost 
inevitably affects the overall supply of crop plants across a range of production systems.  The 
common pool aspect is invoked because of the shared airways that connect all of the individually 
owned fields. And for most of human history (and still in some cultures), food itself was thought 
of as a common resource.  Most contamination documented thus far has been through the air – 
pollination, wind, etc. – with a smaller percentage due to errors in the handling system.  The 
individual property rights are superseded by the need to cooperate in keeping the air from 
adversely affecting yield, diversity and profitability.  Common-pool resources include two basic 
principles.  First, there must be partial or total non-exclusivity; meaning no individual has 
exclusive rights thus allowing the resource to be exploited by any one individual or 
community.
220
  No one, nor the government, has exclusive rights to the air, though some actors 
may regulate it in various ways.  Second, the idea of indivisibility is important as it allows for 
one individual or group to subtract the amount available to others, when they choose to use part 
of the resource.
221
  While the absolute total amount of air remains the same for all actors 
involved, the quality of air as it relates to the sustenance of a  diversity of practices may be 
diminished with the introduction of GE material. 
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Moreover, the outcome here would similarly attempt to determine how the actors ie. 
producers and developers, are managing, and in turn how they can manage, the agricultural crop 
resource in a way that ensures the long term self-governing sustainability of crop diversity.  Once 
the level of self-organisation is determined, it becomes possible to identify which combination of 
variables can be associated with a certain outcome which in turn allows one to make reasoned 
recommendations for pre-determined end use objectives, in this case, an equitable system to 
allocate liability for loss of revenue due to GE contamination.  Case studies using the SES 
framework have looked at what conditions are present and what the users develop in order to 
create a sustainable system of managing the resource.  The studies that Ostrom and others have 
conducted indicate that when the rules do not match the attributes of the resource system, 
resource units, and users, long-term sustainability is not possible.
222
 
“SESF includes variables that depict the dynamics of the ecological system that are 
relevant to humans, such as growth rate, equilibrium properties, and productivity.”223  The first 
level of examination is the resource system, resources unit, government systems and actors to 
determine the ecological and social interactions and eventual outcomes.  Here the resource 
systems and units pertain to the localised air channels and the GE material respectively.  The 
government systems include the regulatory bodies described in section 3 and the actors include 
both GE and non-GE growers as well as the seed developers themselves. A broader set of 
contextual variables related to the attributes of the social-ecological system must then be 
established to determine the system outcomes.  The following list (Table 1) was constructed by 
previous researchers as a possible second tier of variables in Ostrom‟s SESF.224  
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Table 1: Second-tier variables of a social-ecological system.
225
  
Resource Systems (RS)  
RS1 Sector (e.g. water, forests, pasture) 
RS2 Clarity of system boundaries 
RS3 Size of resource system* 
RS4 Human-constructed facilities 
RS5 Productivity of system* 
RS6 Equilibrium properties 
RS7 Predictability of system dynamics* 
RS8 Storage characteristics 
RS9 Location 
Governance Systems (GS) 
GS1 Government organizations 
GS2 Nongovernment organizations 
GS3 Network structure 
GS4 Property-rights systems 
GS5 Operational rules 
GS6 Collective-choice rules* 
GS7 Constitutional rules 
GS8 Monitoring and sanctioning processes 
 
Resource Units (RU)  
RU1 Resource unit mobility* 
RU2 Growth or replacement rate 
RU3 Interaction among resource units 
RU4 Economic value 
RU5 Number of units 
RU6 Distinctive markings 
RU7 Spatial and temporal distribution 
 
Users (U) 
U1 Number of users* 
U2 Socioeconomic attributes of users 
U3 History of use 
U4 Location 
U5 Leadership/entrepreneurship* 
U6 Norms/social capital* 
U7 Knowledge of SES/mental models* 
U8 Importance of resource* 
U9 Technology used 
*Subset of variables found to be associated with self-organization. 
By applying these variables to several different case studies, Ostrom was able to 
established eight "design principles" of stable common pool resource management.
226
  Some of 
these principles will be applicable for the current study and will help shape the 
recommendations. 
6.2.2 Policy Criteria for Analysis 
 To complement the above assessment approach which views the “ecological system from 
an anthropocentric perspective, that is, they look at the ecological system from the point of view 
of its utility to humans”,227 a policy assessment framework goes further by viewing the 
regulatory system explicitly for its costs and benefits to society.  The OECD developed an 
assessment framework aimed at measuring and comparing the usefulness of traditional 
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regulation with that of potential alternative measures, keeping in mind the political constraints in 
policy making while achieving public objectives.  Given that the most common response to a 
governance issue has tended to be traditional „command and control‟ regulation, this model 
allows one to determine if this is indeed the appropriate mechanism or if instead a non-traditional 
policy approach would be more suitable.  In the current context, this approach is suitable as it 
allows for a comparison of Canada's liability regime with those used in other jurisdictions (see 
section 5). 
This approach requires that the traditional model aimed at addressing a public objective 
be assessed by its effectiveness, efficiency and fairness.  Here effectiveness is meant to 
determine if the policy approach does indeed resolve the problem it was introduced to solve.  
Defining the state‟s objectives become crucial at this point.  Determining efficiency requires 
asking whether the policy approach minimises “both the direct compliance costs borne by those 
subject to the regulation, and other, often more indirect, costs which may be imposed on the 
public.”228  The fairness component of the OECD model asks about the distribution of those 
costs and benefits, which will ultimately have an effect on the level of actor compliance, and in 
return the overall effectiveness of the policy.  However, given the importance of the fairness 
element to my analysis, because of the lack of explicit attention to this topic in the current 
regulatory framework, I wish to alter this section to enhance its illustrative power.  I will use the 
ethical matrix proposed by Ben Mepham
229
 designed to assess the ethics of introducing novel 
foods.  Mepham‟s conditions for an ethical design are to look at the regulatory effects on the 1) 
wellbeing, 2) autonomy and 3) justice (in trade and law) of both the a) actors and the b) 
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environment.  Similarly, this paper will ask how the current liability framework affects the 
wellbeing, autonomy and justice of the producers, the environment and the industry. 
7. Assessment 
 The following section is an application of the principles and criteria outlined in the 
ecological and policy assessment frameworks above to GE crop management.  Where possible 
the assessment is related to the norms and rules of Canadian regulatory context.  While many 
observations can be made regarding the GE regulatory framework within these parameters, the 
recommendations that fallow in section 8 will narrow in on a few key points. 
7.1 Assessment Results: Principles 
Zoë Robaey has taken the polluter‟s pay notion of fairness and applied it to the GE 
context, finding that instead of attaching responsibility to those who „pollute‟ the environment 
with GE, which can become a difficult test to use given that natural elements, like the wind, 
plays a significant role, it is one‟s ownership in the material that creates a type of duty.  
Ownership can be defined in many ways but given that “Monsanto is releasing a new version of 
its modified soy and putting a lot of efforts in writing up contracts that will uphold their 
economic rights,”230 and there is no doubt that the Canadian courts are going towards 
acknowledging the seed developers as the rightful intellectual property owners of both the seeds 
and the subsequent plants, it suggests that the developers are at a minimum part owners.  
Ownership can however be shared my multiple parties and the growers of GE plants can easily 
be regarded as part owners as well, at least from the planting to harvesting stages.  Through 
ownership, one becomes in charge of making decisions regarding how to utilize the material, in a 
way that is not possible for those who do not take part in the ownership.  “From the perspective 
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of fairness, moral responsibility should be assigned to those who make these decisions”,231 that 
is, the decision to release and/or profit from the GE crops.  A further note to this is that 
Monsonto‟s decision to settle Schmeiser‟s subsequent 2008 claim for seed contamination by 
paying for the clean-up costs,
232
 suggests that the company is aware of their ownership as well as 
their responsibility to keep it from drifting.  A liability scheme that allows for moral 
responsibility should then be shouldered by the developers and or the growers.  However strict 
liability schemes could also mandate that the decision makers be financially responsible for 
ensuing damages since the responsibility is tied to the ability to make decisions, not the system‟s 
imbedded ideas of morality. 
7.2 Assessment Results: SESF 
Looking at the SESF factors it is easy to see that establishing an appropriate level of self -
organisation for sustainable co-existing GE farming will be a difficult feat.  The Resources 
System (RS) size and lack of defined boundaries will make it problematic to manage as these are 
often noted as key factors in organisational outcomes.
233
  Even if/when the RS boundaries can be 
defined (perhaps by different agricultural regions and the reasonable area in which gene flow is 
expected to reach) the Governance System (GS) is not set up to accommodate these boundaries.  
As mentioned above, the constitution delineates the responsibilities by interest areas between the 
provinces and the federal government, each government striving for some or primary control 
over an issue. This means that boundaries are drawn up for political purposes, not necessarily for 
ecological or social needs.  The Resources Unit (RU) is highly mobile, in fact, that is one of its 
basic characteristics.  The RU‟s interaction with other resource units is at the heart of the issue 
and creates a very unpredictable system.  The lack of scientific data on how the gene 
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modifications will respond or alter when interacting with other natural elements, heightens the 
chance of resource depletion (both airspace and crop diversity) and limits the ability to self-
govern as the users are unable to define collective rules.  The number of Users (U) also makes it 
difficult to define collective rules as the participants are not obvious, limiting the excludability 
factor.  The number may also be very large which hinders effective leadership necessary for 
organisational productivity.  Add to this the long history of unwillingness of firms and farmers to 
share business information in order to keep a competitive edge, suggests that organisational work 
that may require the relinquishment of short term gain for long term sustainability will be 
challenging. 
 7.2.1 Self-Organising 
There is evidence of self-governing attempts (mostly by non-GE users) but this gets 
trumped by industry influence and the promise of increasing industry wide wealth (RU4).   Users 
that implement buffers or groups that advocate the use of tracking programs may facilitate co-
existence through the use of human-constructed facilities (RS4). Areas that collectively agree to 
zone/practice a particular agricultural model within their region (Haliburton Community Organic 
Farm)
234
 also exhibit a type of collective choice to establish rules to encourage co-existence.  
However, the biotechnology industry has been able to take advantage of the socioeconomic 
attributes of users (U2), given the ever increasingly dependency of farmers to seek marginal 
economic gains.  It is this individualisation of choice than that allows the industry influence to 
promote its agenda above other alternatives.  Further, the biotech industry‟s heavy emphasis on 
the economic importance of the resources (U8) incentivises the Governance System to ensure 
expedited market access.  As a result, the GS has designed the GE regulatory system to support 
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the expedient commercialized approach and restricted public involvement in the rule making 
phases, again limiting the awareness of the collective impact of individual choices.   
Although more adversarial in nature, some self-organising can be seen by the individuals 
and groups that are attempting to use the courts to create a new set of rules on GE liability.  
Whether it be through traditional trespassing claims or new ways of approaching property rights, 
users are taking advantage of non-governmental approaches to creating shared rules on how to 
establish a system of co-existence.  However this approach has again favoured industry by 
relying on corporate law principles and being deferential to the legislature.
235
 
 7.2.2 Common Pool Management 
The current system reinforces common pool resource depletion.  The lack of appropriate 
recourse for financial losses caused by GE contamination encourages greater use of the RU and 
disregards long term effects of the common pool resource.  Given that contamination of an 
organic or conventional field means that the soil will not be GE free for several years, depriving 
the land of its former use, the equilibrium properties (RS6) of the RS weigh heavily in favour of 
a principled, precautionary approach.  The lack of recourse despite the reality that almost all 
organic canola in Canada is now contaminated to some degree that partnering countries no 
longer accept it as a viable organic crop, means there is no deterrent to future resource 
exhaustion.  Since GE seed‟s natural ability to contaminate and the inability of “re-populating” 
the resources, crops and the airspace, as one might do in fisheries, a precautionary approach is 
needed.   
The system also needs to be adaptive and reactionary.  Not all GE crops cross-
contaminate via the same methods (eg. some use wind while others rely on insects) and such 
differences need to be taken into consideration when establishing the framework.  Several 
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common pool resource studies have indicated that the “lack of recognized property systems have 
led to one-size-fits-all recommendations to impose particular policy solutions that frequently 
fail.”236  An adaptive approach that can react to changing dynamics would be particularly 
important in this case given the resource system‟s unpredictability.  An ecosystem policy 
approach that looks at smaller areas that can be made accountable for contamination and allows 
for regional differences may be a more effective management strategy.  Some areas may want to 
collectively sign off on organic-only terms while other areas that see more benefit in GE can then 
regulate accordingly in their region.  This really speaks to the need for provincial or regional 
oversight powers. 
“Since GM seeds are perceived as bad by some, and good by others, and as we saw 
earlier, regulation does not seem to solve this issue, we can infer that there is a gap in dealing 
with hazards of GM seeds.” 237  This gap may be corrected in part by increasing the self-
organisation of the affected actors.  To encourage self-organisation and thus sustainable 
management of the resources, greater knowledge of the SES (U7) may prove beneficial.  “When 
users share common knowledge of relevant SES attributes, how their actions affect each other, 
and rules used in other SESs, they will perceive lower costs of organizing.”238  This reiterates 
other findings from this analysis that suggests greater actor participation is necessary for a fair 
and effective liability regime.  This participation, if done transparently can also advance one of 
the main design principles, that of trust building.  Common pool resource depletion has been 
found to occur less often where there is high degree of trust among the actors.
239
  Where the 
actors re known to each other and feel some kind of duty towards each other, born out of that 
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trusting relationship, it is less likely that one will act in a way that will be detrimental.  Again 
this may suggest the need to regulate on a smaller, regional or ecosystem basis in order to 
establish a sustainable organisational outcome of this complex system. 
7.3 Assessment Results: OECD Policy 
  7.3.1 Effectiveness 
 Measuring the effectiveness of the current GE policies requires a clear defining of the 
government‟s official objectives.  Health Canada, for instance, works to protect the health and 
safety of Canadians.
240
 The “CFIA is responsible for regulating both the performance (or 
efficacy) and the environmental safety of the product in question.”241  The government asserts 
that their aim is to pursue a science-based risk assessment of GE products to unsure Canadian‟s 
are not exposed to unnecessary health and other risks but similarly pursue economic gain, which 
can be seen by their focus on accommodating pre-market assessments.
242
  A recently proposed 
domestic policy framework for the detection of low level presence of GE in imported goods 
reflects this dual aim.  The policy‟s listed objective is to “minimize disruptions to trade while 
protecting the health and safety of humans, animals and the environment.”243  It is clear then that 
the objective is to develop a (safe) robust agriculture sector which could only be done through a 
form of co-existence between GE and non-GE crops. 
 The current policies may be considered effective in this regard depending on how one 
defines what a robust agriculture sector looks like.  In terms of maximizing gross exports, the 
government has successfully created policies to manage this objective.  Policies that place the 
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onus on biotechnology companies to alert the government of possible novel traits, and the weak 
investigative role of the agency, help ensure an expedient market approvals process.  However, 
in the long term the liability framework appears unsustainable given the persistent pushback on 
GE products among Canada‟s major trading partners.  Moreover, the rapid increase in 
recognition of a wider scope of damages, including pure economic loss, within liability models 
overseas suggests Canada‟s pre-market focused model will be ineffective in dealing with 
impending concerns.  “In 2009, contamination from GM flax found in Canadian flax exports to 
Europe cost Canadian farmers millions of dollars and lucrative markets,”244 for which GE 
farmers, developers and even government authorities alike may find themselves legally 
responsible r as more robust liability concepts become established. 
 The inherent inevitability of contamination due to natural forces such as the wind and 
pollination further complicates the traditional policy approach that the Canadian government has 
established.  Add to this the inevitable human errors in the handing process and it is apparent that 
co-existence is not in reality possible, which will have detrimental effects on maintaining a 
diverse agribusiness in the long run. The regulatory system is not set up to cope with these 
scenarios nor is it likely to by continuing to build on existing laws and institutions as has been 
the aim since 1993.
245
  Traditional command and control policies as is used in the current 
situation are aimed at telling one what to do or not to do.  This of course is not possible with such 
things as nature and as such a more appropriate approach to liability is required that can 
accommodate and adapt to changes at a much faster rate. 
 
 
                                                          
244
 Canadian Biotechnology Action Network (CBAN), (Farmers Protest “Industry Spin” Designed to Facilitate 
Licensing of GM Alfalfa in Ontario. 
245
 Supra note 241. 
74 
 
  7.3.2 Efficiency 
Efficient policy implementation is primarily concerned with curtailing costs.  As far as 
direct administrative costs are concerned, the current system allows for lower administrative 
expenses relative to a more interventionist system, given that the gathering and monitoring duties 
are largely delegated to industry.  However, “true risk management policy needs to be based on 
resiliency, not a corporation‟s desire to make money on its own patented technology.”246  The 
lack of expenditures on service delivery costs, which results in the efficient policy, is also 
responsible for the lack of investigative oversight power and, consequently, a downloading of 
both costs and responsibility to non-users.  While CFIA does provide a great deal of energy and 
money on ensuring that the data submitted by industry is reviewed, the more apt service delivery 
in this context would be one that actively pursues co-existence; at a minimum providing similar 
reviewing services to submissions by possible affected parties other than industry. 
However, this is counter to what the OECD considered appropriate since the most 
efficient policy instrument is also supposed to maximise community welfare.
247
  Given that the 
policy to achieve co-existence is virtually impossible, the expenses of its failure are then shifted 
to farmers and society at large.  This second component, public costs, is then potentially very 
high in terms of health, consumer choice and environmental diversity.  The extent of these costs 
is yet unknown but even preliminary estimates of “cleaning” up GE contaminates is very high.  
Farmers have already had extensive costs in order to test their seed supply for contamination, 
clean up and in other cases have had to forgo planting certain (lucrative) crops in order to 
maintain seed purity.
248
  Since the regulatory system does not incorporate a clear means of 
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accountability for managing the economic fallout of GE drift, it means that the costs become 
privatised and the burdened parties are forced to find contractual or market based solutions.  
While market solutions may not be inherently flawed, there is certainly a power dynamic present 
in the current situation that must be taken into consideration. 
In minimising these indirect costs, the precautionary principle suggests that in light of the 
inherent uncertainties, state action should be taken to mitigate risk (despite the organizational 
costs).  The lack of direct recourse mechanisms for these risks adds to the high public costs 
because parties are forced to spend money negotiating or litigating for rights that are as of yet 
undefined or overlapping with each other.  Therefore, there ought to be some government branch 
that is empowered with investigative properties and mandated to create a scheme that allows for 
an efficient distribution of service delivery that also encourages risk reduction.  An element of 
flexibility should still be included to allow for those regulated to find the lowest cost point of 
compliance as this can encourage greater effectiveness,
249
 but not at the expense of reducing 
social wellbeing.  One avenue of flexibility might be to allow a range of choice in how remedies 
are to be paid or possibly a funding structure that allows for indemnification is certain situations. 
 7.3.3 Fairness 
“The perceived fairness and political accountability of different instruments can influence 
the public‟s acceptance of the instrument.”250  The two main instruments ensuring this 
accountability, according to the OECD report, are the government‟s apparent level of operational 
transparency and the maintenance of appropriate appeal mechanisms.  Much has already been 
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written on the lack of transparency in the regulatory system; from the gathering of information to 
how it is applied to assessing safety standards.
251
  
  7.3.3a Transparency 
 In terms of liability, there is much confusion on what the appropriate method for redress 
is and conflicting messages from the authoritative bodies adds to this perceived lack of 
transparency.  Statements by government officials affirming that the common law approach is an 
adequate one for redress for organic farmers and that a separate cause of action would not be 
necessary to address issues arising from contamination conflicts with what the courts have 
suggested.
252
  In fact, one court has gone so far as to put forward that rather than allowing redress 
for economic loss, the organic certification process ought to be altered to allow for greater GE 
contamination so as not to impose hardship on biotech users.
253
  Adding to the confusion and 
perceived weak accountability is the fact that damages, particularly in terms of financial impacts, 
have not been properly defined in the regulatory process.  While concerns about weediness are 
taken into consideration, whether the economic consequences of these environmental alterations 
are factored in remains unclear.  None of the applicable statutes clearly allow for recouping on 
pure economic loss nor do they incorporate language that contemplates the financial 
repercussions of losing one‟s organic or other certification. 
7.3.3b Appeal Mechanisms 
Appropriate appeal mechanisms to an independent body help ensure institutional 
legitimacy, however, those that are currently regulated (biotechnology developers) do not have 
access to an autonomous appeal board or similar institution.  Nor, is one arguably needed given 
that the regulatory framework is already largely setup to the advantage of the regulated parties.  
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Instead, it may be more appropriate to inquire about the appeal mechanism for those not directly 
regulated but nevertheless affected.  There are not only limited opportunities for non-regulated 
parties to participate in the approvals process,  there is no chance to appeal to an independent 
body for an objective assessment given CFIA‟s conflict of interest in the matter.254  The courts 
are the only conceivable route at the moment but that takes us back to the weaknesses described 
above.  Courts are also expensive, inaccessible and given the time lag to see a case through, the 
remedy may occur too late.  Ultimately the courts do not appear to be an appropriate tool that can 
be used by non-regulated parties to objectively question the approvals process. 
  7.3.3c Wellbeing 
Taking a more thorough ethical analysis of the liability regime, according to Ben 
Mepham, requires one to question the overall wellbeing that the system has on the environment, 
producers and the industry.   
Ecological wellbeing is severally undermined by the use of substantial equivalence (SE) 
as the threshold test since this is largely a policy decision, rather than a scientific assessment.  
“Substantial equivalence is not intended to be a scientific formulation; it is a conceptual tool for 
food producers and government regulators.” 255  However, in Canada SE is used as an explicit 
rule codifying the assumption that the “new crop poses no more risks than a counterpart that is 
already considered safe.”256  The issue that arises is that many newly introduced GE seeds are 
not considered novel which then allows them to bypass a fuller analysis.  Even if the assessment 
framework were to include an explicit fairness analysis, many of the GE seed varieties would not 
be required to undergo such a review.  Therefore, the concepts of novelty and SE need to be 
altered so as to integrate the unknown ecological and economic risks.  Instead of focusing on the 
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SE or novelty of the final GE product, the regulatory apparatus could instead be focused on the 
uniqueness of the process of introducing the GE seed into the marketplace.  “In most countries, 
[GE crops] call for special measures [even if SE], whereas conventionally bred seeds do not.”257  
If the seed requires special applications in getting to or into the marketplace (eg. buffer zones) 
then this points to a need for a heightened level of responsibility due to its uniqueness.  This 
should then trigger a wider assessment process since the idea of finding uniqueness itself 
acknowledges a suspicion of risk.   
While one might argue that the suspicion of risk is too low of a threshold to trigger 
further assessments (given that these special measures are in place precisely to manage this risk), 
at a minimum the different industry practices would suggests that they are not SE to 
conventional products, at least in terms of process.  This undermines the current assessment 
method since it is this idea of equivalency that the regulatory system is based on.  Add to this 
that the precautionary principle espoused in Castonguay Blasting Ltd. v. Ontario 
(Environment)
258
 affirmed that in cases of suspected risk there is a responsibility to include a 
precautionary reporting methodology. 
The system also is not good for the wellbeing of the farming community at large.  The 
one-sided participation and the lack of institutional recourse means that farmers are pitted against 
each other in an adversarial process, creating heightened tension in a community that is feeling 
the increasing pressure to compete on an industrialised scale.  The ecological and financial 
uncertainty that the introduction of GE brings to non GE growers creates a wider rift between the 
two sectors.  Furthermore, the uncertainty in how to claim for financial loss due to 
contamination, because of the overlapping proprietary rights between GE farmers and GE 
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developers, leaves many GE growers uncertain of their future monetary liability,
259
 again 
heightening the tension and division between different farming sectors. 
The GE regulatory framework does not allow for a great deal of autonomy.  The freedom 
of the actors is hampered due to the limited scope of interaction between the institutions 
regulating GE development and the affected parties.  The regulations set out a very standardised 
path for approval, building on existing laws and expertise rather than accounting for possible 
nuanced approaches and effects.  There does not appear to be leeway to allow for adaptability in 
governing within contextualized situations; for example, allowing for the introduction of GE 
seeds in ways that permit  negotiated agreements or localised regulations.  This limitation is in 
large part due to the division of powers within the constitution: delegating matters to either the 
national or provincial governments.  Municipal/regional powers are a privilege granted by the 
provincial governments and do not have their own stand-alone constitutional rights.  Some level 
of provincial interest is likely a precondition to localised arrangements.  However, cases such as 
114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech) v. Hudson (Town)
260
 demonstrate that it is possible for 
municipalities to implement local laws, at least within the scope of protecting human health. 
The contracted agreements that go along with the seed‟s sale stipulating how to plant and 
harvest GE seeds, are meant for the purchaser alone and do not take into consideration the agri-
industry wide effects or regional ecology.  The current approach is very much top down and 
given the lack of recourse available to non-GE farmers, growers can be forced out of their 
preferred farming practice by for example, losing their organic certification.  This is a significant 
limitation on their autonomy, particularly in terms of their freedom to sell and market as they 
wish.  Self-organising rules to protect the common pool for sustainable farming would need to 
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incorporate procedures that negotiate the restrictions of either group of actors and the 
repercussions of not abiding by those limits.  That may be in the form of designating different 
zoning by-laws for autonomous type regions or financial consequences that allow for some form 
of equilibrium. 
The final ethical quandary is if a scheme is fair in trade and law.  There is evidence that 
trade distortions are affecting non-GE farmers due to Canada‟s system.  Given the different 
thresholds for contamination in various countries, Canadian farmers can be disadvantaged or 
barred from trading opportunities due to the lax regulatory requirements such as traceability.  
This was the case with canola when the EU put a blanket restriction on its import from Canada 
because of their lack of faith in the scheme‟s ability to contain contamination.261  Further, the 
farmers have no recourse for these financial loses within the regulations, because, under contract 
law individual farmers could be held liable for the not delivering on the original 
agreement/shipment.
262
  Another example would be the Bt seed developed by Monsanto which 
reduces organic farmer‟s ability to effectively practice their pest control program and ultimately 
reduces their competiveness in the marketplace.
263
  The regulatory system does not account for 
these effects on other farm populations within the approval process.  In achieving the objective 
of a robust export industry, trade has been defined broadly as gross export profit rather than a 
more nuanced approach that looks at the disparate domestic effects that such a policy has. 
Competing property laws are at work with GE-farming that are not taken into 
consideration in the regulatory framework which can also be inequitable.  There are the 
intellectual property rights of the developers and the traditional seed saving rights of farmers.  
The judicial trend of acknowledging intellectual property rights above other rights is a clear 
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undermining of initial legislative intent of the acts in question.  „Fairness in law‟ has often been 
understood to mean that a particular law is fair when it has been enacted by the appropriate 
jurisdiction.  The current scheme, however, has shifted much of the responsibility of determining 
liability to the judiciary, instead of the appropriate jurisdiction which is parliament.  The courts 
have consequently relied on their vast knowledge of IP law which looks at infringements 
(violations) rather than the unfamiliar area of positive obligations to not impose that property on 
others.  The unfairness occurs at two places then.  Once, when the law is being decided in the 
inappropriate authority and a second time, when the party‟s rights are viewed unequally given 
the narrow field within which the courts must define the issues. 
8. Recommendations   
 Using the results from the above analysis, I have developed a set of recommendations on 
how the government should proceed to establish an equitable liability scheme.  The ideal 
framework would be one that allows for businesses that have lost revenue due to contamination 
to recoup those sums from a duty bearer that is able to pay but also allows for sufficient 
collective responsibility to increase the „buy-in‟ to the system and consequently the 
effectiveness. 
 8.1 Structure of the Scheme 
Give these factors, rather than a new common law cause of action under negligence or a 
traditional “command and control” statutory liability system, I would suggest establishing a 
compensatory fund because this would allow for strict liability while reducing some direct costs 
that are associated with traditional statutes.  This is in line with an efficient policy that also takes 
the precautionary principle into consideration.  Fairness would also be taken into consideration 
since strict liability eliminates the need for elaborate appeal systems. 
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8.2 Causation   
Perhaps the most pressing problematic issue that a compensatory fund resolves is the 
burden of proving causation.  The inability of the regulators and the courts to account for natural 
processes of dispersion of seed and pollen is at the root of the contamination issue.  A 
compensatory fund does not require one to definitively point to a culpable individual who 
through their actions (negligently or otherwise) triggered the applicants‟ loss.  The loss itself, if 
connected to contamination, is sufficient to allow for compensation.  The causality principle 
enumerated in the Lugano Convention would overcome this burden.  Article 10 “formulates that 
the court shall take due account of the increased danger of causing such damage inherent in the 
dangerous activity.”264  In the Canadian context, the language of „danger‟ could be replaced with 
risk to accommodate the political stigma that such terminology may have.  Nevertheless, such an 
act would allow for a lower standard of proof when the damage is typical of such activity.  The 
proof needed then would be to 1. show that loss was suffered due to contamination and 2. that 
contamination was not brought on by the applicant‟s own actions.  While the burden of proof 
still rests largely with the applicant, the level to which they must demonstrate is significantly 
reduced with the elimination of showing direct human induced causation.   
This reduction in the burden of proof to show causation is justified as it allows for a fairer 
system.  Given the ecological inevitability of GE contamination many farmers will be unable to 
establish causation to a particular „wrong dower‟ and without recourse.  Instead of spending the 
resources on trying to figure out whom to blame, if anyone, strict liability safeguards against 
unequal treatment.  Moreover, fairness, as defined in the above criteria, requires transparency.  
Attaching automatic and strict liability to all those that benefit financially from GE seed 
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production allows for such transparency. The ability to streamline the evidentiary burden can 
also reduce confusion among the users that are forced to seek compensation. 
The lowered burden of causation also comports with the polluter pay principle as 
explained by Zoë Robaey above.  Since it is the introduction of risk that attaches to the moral 
responsibility to pay and not the actual act of damaging property, it makes sense to distribute the 
obligation to pay amongst all those contributing to the heightened risk.  This is in fact not a far 
stretch from the newer test for causation needed for negligence under Canadian law; that one 
need only make a material contribution to the plaintiff‟s loss.265  The proposed causation may 
properly be said to attach when one materially contributes to the risk of loss. 
8.3 Funding the Scheme 
The fund could be financed, at least in part, through a type of GE Seed tax that would 
have all those who take advantage of GE seeds ie. developers, end users etc. contribute to the 
fund.  A similar system of taxing has been introduced in Portugal where the fund is maintained 
through direct taxes, interest on the unused tax amounts and application fees.  This would again 
be in line with an effective model given the efficient manner in which the funds can be collected. 
Fairness is considered as well as the polluters pay principle, as defined in this paper, is at the 
heart of the taxing system. 
Such a system would allow for an adaptive governance system, which is necessary to 
adequately manage and avoid resource depletion, as outlined by Ostrom and the above analysis.  
Adaptability is achieved by allowing the tax to fluctuate over time based on the previous year(s) 
payouts to compensate for loss.  If there is an increase in the amount of contamination, and 
therefore the amount of funding needed to compensate for that lose, the tax levels will rise in 
conjunction with these changes.  Once the premiums become too costly, the impetus is modified 
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to allow for equilibrium to occur. If the “cost” i.e. the tax rises to the point where those putting 
the risk into the environment find the benefits are no longer worth it, the system can begin to 
regulate itself to a degree (a mixed form of self-organization).  Another possible effect may be a 
more fundamental change in the way that GE research is conducted.  Since some uses of the 
technology are less problematic than others, the biotech industry may take these liability costs 
into consideration when pursing future market opportunities.   
One possible draw back to avoid is the possibility that the deep-pockets of a few polluters 
would skew the system in a manner that would allow for a type of „buy out‟ of conventional 
farming crops, that is, if the tax levels are at a point that makes it more efficient to pay rising 
premiums instead of managing the risk of contamination.  Such a scenario may permit increasing 
contamination to the point where damages are irreversible.  This situation may be avoided by 
factoring in long-term economic and biological loss due to contamination into the tax premiums.  
This may mean that premiums are fixed to increase as the contamination problem expands; 
including a type of calculation of the loss suffered due to the industry‟s inability to maintain a 
diversity of practices and crop varieties.  As the common pool nears closer to exhaustion, so 
must the premiums rise to reflect the irreversibility of the situation.  Such a robust system could 
be justified by arguing that it is looking out for the wellbeing of the environment as well as the 
industry as a whole.  Rising premium rates would stand in for a clear indication that biodiversity, 
along with the freedom to choose one farming practice, is at risk and in need of corrective formal 
state action. 
8.4 Authority 
There may be an issue with the use of a compensatory fund in that it may be challenged 
as an infringement of international trade law.  If the fund is regulated in a way that it is deemed a 
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subsidy or trade protection that gives some farmers an unfair trading advantage, the government 
would be liable for compensation to their trading partners.  However, the regulations could 
instead be drafted more akin to a type of crop insurance scheme which would be acceptable so 
long as the government did not offer advantageous insurance premiums to indirectly subsidise 
farmers.  This dilemma should be avoided as long as the GE seed tax covered the full liability 
amount and did not require the government to act as a guarantor.  There may still be a plausible 
argument that the state, in facilitating the program is acting in a manner that allows for an unfair 
advantage in trade.   
The fund would have the further advantage of providing an avenue to test and gather data 
for a possible private based insurance market in the future to complement the compensatory fund 
scheme. 
Initially it would make sense that the fund would have some central management to keep 
administrative costs down, therefore the federal government as the lead regulator may be 
appealing.  The current federally regulated, provincially delivered, Crop Insurance Act‟s 
objective seems to incorporate this possibility: a “program that stabilizes a producer's income by 
minimizing the financial impacts of production losses caused by natural hazards.”266   
However, a more important factor then minimising costs (which conceivably are already 
lower than a more traditional fault-finding liability scheme) is the protection of community 
wellbeing.  Overall what is required is a system that will allow for an adaptive governance 
system by implementing a type of ecosystem policy approach that does not delineate 
responsibility narrowly along federal or provincial lines but rather factors in multiple interests 
and influences.  In light of this objective, stronger leadership from the provincial authorities 
would be beneficial as they have the power to delegate powers and capacity building to 
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municipal levels under section 13, Property and Civil Rights in the Province, which includes the 
regulation of trade and industry within the province.
267
  This approach would alleviate some 
concerns raised in the SESF assessment.  Managing a common pool resource requires clear 
boundaries which are extremely difficult in this case.  However, managing the fund provincially 
allows for the establishment of different rates between or even within provinces that allows for 
the variances in plant contamination rates; based on whether they utilize the air and the expected 
or reasonable distances the pollen will travel.  While the boundaries may not coincide with 
political boundaries, smaller, defined boundaries can be established for the relevant specie under 
review. This is important given the different agricultural priorities between provinces.  PEI has a 
much lower GE adoption rate then the prairies.  As the rate of GE crops changes within an area 
so will the levels of liability, allowing for an adaptive governance model.  Though municipal 
level oversight may allow for more nuanced insight, it is unlike that these bodies would have the 
capacity to manage the undertakings involved nor the coordination needed to effectively work 
with the multiple neighbouring and overlapping production areas. 
In order to safeguard against resource depletion, a compensation fund on a more localised 
level would allow for greater protection.  Monitoring rates and data from the liability claims 
regionally will give a more accurate image of how the ecosystem is responding to stressors rather 
than the aggregate claims on a national level.  Precautionary measures can be put in place if an 
area is reaching its ecosystem‟s limits. 
Liability claims however do not need to be limited to the compensatory fund.  Traditional 
tort law remedies should be made available for those who contribute to contamination through 
their negligent or malicious behaviour.  Maintaining civil remedies within the liability 
framework should help with building trust (another important factor in avoiding resource 
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depletion) amongst the users of the fund since there is less fear that one might “free load‟ form 
the common pool by disregarding their contractual obligations.  I would suggest, however, that 
the rules pertaining to good GE crop management should be developed by the community 
members – both GE and non-GE framers.  Currently the rules are delivered by the government in 
conjunction with industry.  Allowing some public participation can encourage information 
sharing and consequently some self-organising practices.  While this is not nearly to the level 
needed to avoid resource exhaustion, given the difficulties of self-organising in this context, 
maintaining traditional command and control polices is still the best option. 
8.5 Damages  
The type of damages that are covered by the fund must be established in advance for both 
transparency reasons and also to establish the parameters of what is expected to be covered to 
calculate the tax rate.  Although public damage is a significant issue, for the purpose of the 
compensatory fund, I would suggest limiting it to only private damages.  Liability for public 
damages should still be sought through traditional routes like the CEPA.  Including public 
damage in the same fund may make the scheme unmanageable.  
Private damage should be defined so to include a wide definition of economic loss, not 
just restricted to the loss of crop price premiums due to de-certification.  The socio-economic 
costs of destroying, cleaning and replanting non-GE crops should be included as heads of 
damages.  The damages should however be limited to contamination above the 0.9% threshold 
because of both practical reasons of limited capabilities to adequately test below this limit and 
the pure economic loss suffered below this level would be difficult to calculate.  Though organic 
certifiers may not accept this as a threshold, policy makers do have the authority to set limits for 
practical and policy management purposes.  A caveat may be put in place that damage below this 
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amount can still be claimed but shifting the onus to establish real and substantial financial loss 
onto the applicant.   
One drawback from this scheme may be that the damage should be limited to claims 
within the year in which the crop is contaminated.  This is needed to ensure that the tax rate is 
properly calculated each year to inform where the point of equilibrium should be.  As well from 
an efficiency stand point such boundaries or limitation periods allow for policy makers to make 
rational decisions with greater certainty.  Unfortunately this means that the compensation cannot 
account for damage that is not initially detectable.  
Establishing the parameters of damages as such allows for an efficient service delivery 
protocol and the administrative costs that the state would take on should be minimal.  Ideally 
these costs would also be covered by the fund itself. 
8.6 Approvals 
 I am recommending a separate system, as opposed to integrating it directly within the GE 
approvals process, because of the current inherent conflict of interest within the departments 
responsible for assessing the products.  However, changes to the assessment process to 
incorporate the risks associated with financial liability should also be made.  Indeed the liability 
claims themselves demonstrates the need to amend the approval regime to disallow applications 
that pose an undue financial hardship in terms of compensation. 
The approvals process ought to have an intra-generational view that looks at future 
liability so that the industry can sustain itself over the long term. Using the common pool 
assessment, it is advisable that a more holistic approach is used which considers social-economic 
factors before an approval is given.  Doing a cost-benefit analysis that considers liability based 
on organic certification standards and property damage, not on normative ideas of what a 
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politically appropriate level of contamination is, ought to be included as a fundamental phase in 
the assessment process. 
Expanding the definition of risk assessment to include social and economic impacts 
would likely incorporate some concerns that organic and integrated pest-management farmers 
have about gene flow contamination, however this will never be enough to avoid all future 
liability.  Therefore, the above redress scheme is necessary to recoup the losses that are not able 
to be factored into the regulatory approvals process.  The best regulatory system will still not be 
adequate since as Ann Slater from NFU states it; you can “tell that to the bees. They do not know 
the difference, and have not signed any coexistence plan.”268  
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